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Artificial Intelligence as Digital Prose in Redefining Originality in Legal Discourse

Rijal Ibnu Sani¹, Suartini², Ahmad³, Tri Cahya Indra Permana⁴

^{1,3,4} Universitas Muhammadiyah Tangerang
Jalan Perintis Kemerdekaan I/33 Cikokol, Kota Tangerang, Banten 15118

² Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia
Jalan Sisingamangaraja No.1, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan, 12110

* Correspondence email: rijalibnu.sani@umt.ac.id

ABSTRACT. This research originates from the phenomenon of moralistic stigma and academic conservatism that tend to perceive the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a degradation of originality in legal scholarship. Historically and empirically, however, the evolution of intellectual instruments from the pen to the computer has consistently transformed modes of expression without ever extinguishing the essence of human thought itself. This study aims to deconstruct the myth of “handwritten originality” while legitimizing AI as a lawful co-creative instrument within the domain of telematics legal writing. Employing a conceptual approach and historical-technological comparison, the research finds that in the era of digital disruption, the essence of originality no longer resides in the mechanical construction of diction, but rather in the authority of logical curation, data validation, and argumentative direction elements that remain fundamentally controlled by the human legal subject as the holder of intellectual agency. The analysis concludes that AI should be understood as “Digital Prose,” evolutionarily comparable to the transformative impact of the typewriter and office software revolutions of previous decades. Systemic resistance to this technology is thus interpreted as a manifestation of technophobia that is increasingly incompatible with contemporary standards of performance, efficiency, and accuracy in modern legal discourse. The study recommends a redefinition of academic ethics that is more inclusive of human-machine collaboration in advancing global legal literacy.

KEYWORDS: Telematics Law, Artificial Intelligence, Originality, Digital Prose.

INTRODUCTION

The history of human civilization is, in essence, a prolonged narrative of technological augmentation (Schäfer et al., 2019). From the invention of the wheel to the steam engine, every technological leap has generated tension between newfound efficiency and nostalgic romanticism (Doli Goswami & Dr. Gitanjali Hazarika, 2025). In academia, we now stand at a similar crossroads with the emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI). A moralistic stigma has arisen, portraying the use of AI in legal journal writing as a betrayal of originality (Mondal et al., 2025). Yet, viewed historically, such resistance mirrors the anxieties of medieval clerics toward Gutenberg’s printing press, which was once feared to erode the “sanctity” of handwritten manuscripts (Schmitz, 2021).

This article proceeds from the thesis that originality in telematics law can no longer be narrowly defined as the “mechanical labor” of assembling words (Isaac & Sundharam, 2025). Rather, originality should be understood as the manifestation of logical sovereignty and intellectual responsibility exercised by the legal subject in

directing technological instruments (Wen & Tong, 2023a). By comparing the evolution of the typewriter and the technological transformation of the accounting profession, this study seeks to deconstruct the taboo surrounding AI usage and to affirm its status as “Digital Prose” an intellectual vehicle that demands navigational skill rather than passive reliance.

A striking double standard characterizes contemporary academic discourse. We readily accept tools such as auto-correct, Grammarly, and machine translation as legitimate aids, yet abruptly adopt a puritan stance when algorithms begin offering sentence structures or data synthesis through generative AI (Suchikova & Tsybuliak, 2025a). Philosophically, this constitutes a logical inconsistency. If spell-checking tools do not diminish the authenticity of a jurist’s thought, why should AI-assisted argument mapping be deemed an intellectual transgression?

This apprehension is rooted in what may be termed “academic romanticism”, a valorization of suffering in the writing process. There exists an implicit assumption that a work is “authentic” only if each letter emerges from exhaustive manual struggle (Kasih et al., 2025). However, from the perspective of telematics law, the value of information is not determined by the medium of its production, but by the integrity of its substance (Viana, 2024). Rejecting AI on grounds of non-originality is therefore a fragile argument; it conflates instrumentality (the tool) with agency (the actor) (Brainard, 2025). As long as logical control, data verification, and juridical conclusions remain under the authority of the researcher, AI functions merely as an extension of human cognition rather than its replacement (Durão et al., 2025).

A clearer perspective emerges when viewed through historical analogy. In the nineteenth century, the transition from quill to typewriter was met with skepticism (Jakobs, 1998). Critics feared that mechanized writing would extinguish the “soul” and personal character of literary works (Wershler, 2023). Similar anxieties resurfaced when personal computers replaced typewriters at the close of the twentieth century (Pigozzi, 2025). Each transitional era has produced intellectual Luddites who believed technological convenience would erode the quality of thought (Tunç & Öcal, 2023).

History, however, demonstrates the opposite. The adoption of computers did not render legal reasoning shallower; instead, it liberated legal scholars from the technical burdens of repetitive typing and facilitated broader and more profound research (Ambekar, 2024). Intellectual output expanded exponentially not because humans became biologically more intelligent, but because their tools became more powerful (Kurzweil, 2022). AI represents the logical continuation of this evolutionary trajectory. To regard AI as a threat to originality is to repeat the same historical misjudgment that once labeled the typewriter a threat to literature (Shramko, 2025).

Valuable insight may be drawn from the evolution of the accounting profession. In earlier periods, an accountant’s professional honor was grounded in meticulous manual calculation within ledger books (Sarawat, 2024b). With the emergence of accounting software, the profession experienced anxiety over the potential erosion of

human relevance (Kuvaldina & Demura, 2024). Yet contemporary reality demonstrates otherwise. The integrity and professionalism of accountants are no longer measured by their ability to manually sum figures, a task now fully delegated to machines.

Today, the value of an accountant resides in analytical capacity: the ability to interpret data, detect anomalies, and provide strategic recommendations based on system-generated outputs (Sarawat, 2024a). This transformation may be described as a shift from process-based integrity to outcome-based legitimacy (Kundhadia, 2025). The same principle applies to legal scholarship. The researcher functions as the “driver” who must understand the mechanics of the AI vehicle being utilized.

To employ AI does not mean passively occupying the passenger seat and allowing the machine to determine direction. Rather, AI usage demands a higher level of navigational expertise. A researcher must know which “route” is legally sound and must distinguish between precise legal reasoning and algorithmic “hallucinations” that may mislead (Nasir et al., 2024). If the intended destination is Bandung but, through ignorance, one permits the AI to navigate toward Lampung, the failure lies not in the engine but in the driver’s lack of competence. In a legal system grounded in liability and responsibility, the human subject retains ultimate authority over direction and truth. AI thus ceases to be a taboo and instead becomes an instrument of acceleration that requires a renewed form of intellectual sovereignty.

This research examines two primary discourses within telematics law: (1) the deconstruction of conventional originality to legitimize AI as “Digital Prose,” and (2) the establishment of parameters of intellectual authority to ensure human control over data validity. The objective is to dismantle academic puritanism rooted in romanticized manual processes while affirming AI’s position as a catalyst for efficient knowledge production without negating human responsibility.

Previous studies have addressed the legitimacy of AI from various perspectives. Campbell (2020) predicted a transition toward more data-driven and measurable legal writing. Qu and Zhang (2023) highlighted the resemblance between AI-generated argumentation and human reasoning, while cautioning against risks related to data validity. Meanwhile, Atiyah et al. (2025) emphasized the potential efficiency gains in legal drafting in Indonesia, contingent upon robust ethical standards. Conversely, Ladislau (2025) offered a critical perspective, arguing that legal language embodies normative nuance that cannot be reduced to statistical patterns.

The novelty of this research lies in reconciling machine efficiency with human sovereignty through what is termed the Navigation Authority Paradigm. Moving beyond Coelho’s (2024) framework, this study conceptualizes originality as an accountable-managerial construct. Authors are no longer required to physically assemble each word; however, they remain fully responsible for validating and ensuring the correctness of premises generated by the system. Consequently, the quality of scholarly work in the digital era is no longer measured by physical exertion, but by the acuity of the author’s navigation in directing technology toward accurate

and relevant legal objectives.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs a qualitative approach to examine the transformation of originality and intellectual authority in the era of telematics and artificial intelligence (Degdo Suprayitno, 2024). The research adopts a doctrinal (normative) legal method, focusing on the analysis of legal concepts, principles, and scholarly arguments related to the use of AI in academic discourse (Ahmad, A, Fachrurrazy, M, et. al, 2024).

The study argues that the so-called “death of conventional originality” should be understood as a transformation toward a renewed form of intellectualism. It distinguishes between AI as an instrument and human authority as the source of intellectual control. In this context, AI functions as a technological tool similar to earlier innovations such as the typewriter and personal computer that enhances efficiency without replacing human reasoning.

Through qualitative and conceptual analysis, this research emphasizes that intellectual ownership remains with the scholar, provided that they maintain control over logical reasoning, validation of arguments, and ethical responsibility. Accordingly, academic integrity in the digital era is measured not by manual effort, but by the accuracy and accountability in utilizing technological tools (Ahmad, A, Fachrurrazy, M, et. al, 2024).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Redefining Originality in the Era of Telematics

Originality must shift from the question of “who assembles the words” to “who assumes responsibility for the truth of the premises.” Artificial Intelligence (AI) functions merely as a data processor, whereas humans remain the holders of intellectual authority (Gulya, 2023).

Within the accelerated landscape of telematics law, we are compelled to re-examine the definition of “originality” that has long been revered (Andrews, 2023). Conventional academic traditions tend to confine originality to a mechanical dimension an almost ritualistic veneration of the physical act of arranging words upon paper or screen (Oburoglu, 2025). Yet, adherence to this narrow definition risks reducing human dignity to that of a “biological typewriter.” In the telematics era, originality must be reconceptualized beyond textual aesthetics toward juridical responsibility: the focus must move from “who constructed the sentences” to “who guarantees the validity of the premises and the integrity of the reasoning.”

A clear distinction must therefore be drawn between functionality and authority. AI, despite its sophistication, remains an information-processing instrument operating on statistical probability. It may generate elegant paragraphs, but it possesses neither legal consciousness nor ethical awareness, and most importantly, it is not a legal subject capable of bearing responsibility (Jiang Na & Xin T, 2025). Humans, by

contrast, retain exclusive intellectual authority. When a legal scholar employs AI, they are essentially utilizing a navigational tool to traverse an expansive sea of data. The originality of a legal article does not lie in the “suffering” involved in composing diction, but in the intellectual capacity of the author to select premises, guide synthesis, and validate each claim generated by the machine.

From a telematics perspective, information is inherently dynamic. Returning to the driving analogy, originality lies in the route chosen and the destination determined. The vehicle (AI) may provide speed, but it is the human who decides whether the chosen route is ethical, logical, and juridically defensible (Evgrafova et al., 2022). Consequently, the fear that AI will extinguish originality reflects a flawed logic. On the contrary, AI challenges humans to ascend from being mere “writers” to becoming “intellectual curators.” The authenticity of future scholarly work will be assessed not by physical exertion, but by the acuity of critical analysis in verifying machine-generated outputs, preventing data hallucinations, and infusing arguments with the normative depth that arises uniquely from human experience and intuition. Ultimately, originality is a matter of accountability: the true creator is the one who stands before the forum and affirms, “this reasoning is sound.

AI as Digital Prose

The argument that AI-generated language is the product of statistical probability does not diminish its scholarly legitimacy; when directed by a legal expert, it may evolve into precise academic work. This is not plagiarism, but rather the optimization of an instrument (Campbell, 2021).

The term “Digital Prose” in this context is not merely a poetic metaphor, but a technical description of how legal language is produced in the algorithmic era (Jeutner, 2025). Ontologically, it must be acknowledged that what Artificial Intelligence (AI) generates consists of statistical probabilities arranged into linguistic form (Cuéllar Rodríguez, 2023). AI does not “think” or “understand” justice in the manner of a jurist; rather, it predicts word distributions based on patterns derived from vast datasets (Razmetaeva, 2024). Yet precisely therein lies its strength. When this statistically driven language is guided by a legal expert possessing a strong theoretical compass, it transforms from a mere aggregation of data into a scholarly work characterized by high precision (Santosh et al., 2024).

To regard AI usage as plagiarism reflects a conceptual error that overlooks the central role of human agency (Eslit, 2025). Plagiarism, in its essential meaning, entails the appropriation of another person’s ideas or work without proper attribution (Department of Languages, University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka & Rathnayake, 2023). Interaction with AI, by contrast, more closely resembles the dialogue between an architect and architectural modeling software (Jang & Lee, 2023). The architect does not “steal” designs from the software; rather, the tool is employed to translate the architect’s vision into a more accurate and measurable form (Fomenko & Balabanov,

2025). In legal scholarship, AI functions as an instrument of optimization, enabling academics to transcend human cognitive limitations in processing vast bodies of references (Zulaikha et al., 2025).

This transition represents a maturation within academia. Instead of expending time and energy on repetitive technical struggles, scholars may allocate their efforts toward sharper analysis and deeper interpretation. The success of “Digital Prose” depends fundamentally on the quality of prompting and validation exercised by the legal expert. Without a competent navigator, AI-generated language remains nothing more than statistical noise. In the hands of a knowledgeable scholar who understands the trajectory of legal debate, however, AI becomes an acceleration engine capable of presenting arguments more coherently, structuring analysis more logically, and integrating references more comprehensively.

Accordingly, the legitimacy of AI-assisted scholarly work should be assessed through a revised standard: not by the origin of the sentences, but by the author’s capacity to assume responsibility for every claim and line of reasoning presented (Hinds & Bedinger Miller, 2023). This is an optimization of instruments in which humans remain the sole orchestrators. We are entering an era in which “authorship” is no longer defined by who holds the pen, but by who governs the logic underlying the flow of data (University of Florida et al., 2025).

A Critique of Intellectual Stigma

The intellectual stigma surrounding the use of AI in academia often stems from an outdated doctrine that glorifies “suffering” as an indicator of quality (Suchikova & Tsybuliak, 2025b). There persists an implicit belief that legal thought is considered valid or “profound” only if it emerges from a prolonged and labor-intensive manual process. However, within the horizon of telematics law, a discipline inherently born of technological acceleration and informational velocity, this paradigm of the “sanctity of manual process” must be critically challenged (Broekman & Fleerackers, 2020). A fundamental question must be posed: does the value of a legal journal lie in the perspiration of its author while crafting diction, or in the precision of its solutions in addressing real legal problems?

Within the telematics ecosystem, the standard of “quality” has undergone a fundamental shift toward what may be termed performance-based legitimacy. Its principal parameters are accuracy, speed, and relevance (Ostrowska, 2021). Law is no longer merely a static philosophical narrative; it is a dynamic instrument required to keep pace with rapid technological developments. If a researcher can produce accurate and relevant analysis in a shorter time through the assistance of AI, this should not be construed as intellectual laziness but rather as the optimization of scholarly performance (Broekman & Fleerackers, 2020). To reject efficiency in favor of preserving slower manual methods is, in fact, a betrayal of law’s essential purpose: to deliver certainty and utility in a timely manner (Pogonowski, 2025).

Moreover, this critique addresses the tendency toward academic elitism that frequently privileges formalism over substance. It must be asserted unequivocally that the endurance involved in manually typing each word does not correlate linearly with the quality of legal reasoning produced. AI functions merely as an instrument that eliminates technical-mechanical barriers, thereby allowing human intellectual energy to be fully allocated to more fundamental endeavors, such as hypothesis testing, theoretical critique, and the pursuit of substantive justice (Coskun Benlidayi, 2024). To characterize the use of AI as intellectual degradation is as misguided as once labeling the printing press a threat to literacy (Kalantzis & Cope, 2025). Ultimately, the integrity of a telematics law scholar is not measured by the length of the “journey on foot” in the writing process, but by the precision with which technological instruments are navigated toward scientifically sound and socially relevant truth

The Legality Aspect

Examining the legality of AI usage inevitably leads to the classical debate concerning the boundary between legal subjects and legal objects. Within conventional copyright doctrine, legal protection is granted to the expression of ideas rather than to the ideas themselves (O’Regan, 2024). The crucial question that arises, therefore, is: if a text is generated through an algorithmic process, who owns the resulting expression? In addressing this issue, AI must not be perceived as an autonomous creator, but rather as an extension of the intellectual will of its user.

From a juridical standpoint, originality in copyright law requires a creativity threshold originating from human agency (Atilla, 2025). In collaborative contexts involving AI, such creativity does not disappear; instead, it transforms into activities such as prompt engineering and substantive curation (Taulli, 2023). The instructions or prompts formulated by a legal expert are not arbitrary commands; they represent the embodiment of conceptual frameworks, logical structures, and theoretical boundaries designed by the human mind (Ng et al., 2024). AI merely executes these instructions into textual form. Accordingly, the relationship between author and AI is analogous to that between a photographer and a camera, or an architect and design software (Geiß, 2024). The camera processes light, but it is the photographer who determines angle, lighting, and timing, elements that ultimately shape the artistic value of the work (Sarwan, 2023).

Furthermore, the legality of AI-assisted scholarship is reinforced through the final stages of selection and validation. A scholarly work does not attain legitimacy merely upon being generated by a data-processing system. It must undergo processes of editing, legal fact verification, and theoretical synchronization conducted by the researcher. Where a legal expert exercises intellectual intervention by selecting, modifying, and approving AI-generated outputs, creative control remains firmly in human hands. Copyright therefore continues to vest in the human author, who bears responsibility for the truth and integrity of the content (Lu, 2024).

In telematics law, it is well established that technology itself does not bear legal liability; only legal subjects, human beings, may be held accountable or credited for a work (Wen & Tong, 2023b). Accordingly, the use of AI to optimize legal writing does not constitute a violation of legality. Rather, it represents a new modality for manifesting originality in the digital era, provided that ultimate authority remains anchored in human reason (Sharma et al., 2024).

CONCLUSION

The so-called death of conventional originality should not be regarded as a tragedy, but rather as the dawn of a renewed intellectualism in the era of telematics. Through the deconstruction of stigma surrounding Artificial Intelligence (AI), this study concludes that fears of originality's disappearance stem from a failure to distinguish between instrumentality and authority. AI, as "Digital Prose," occupies a position evolutionarily comparable to the revolutions of the typewriter and the personal computer; it is an acceleration engine that liberates humans from repetitive mechanical burdens and elevates them toward higher levels of analytical engagement.

Just as an accountant retains control over data integrity despite relying on automated software, a legal scholar remains the rightful owner of originality so long as they maintain authority over logical curation, premise validation, and ethical responsibility. The mobility analogy illustrates that reaching one's destination through the "vehicle" of AI does not diminish intellectual value, provided the scholar demonstrates mastery in navigating the technology and avoids logical error or data hallucination. Ultimately, academic integrity in the modern era is no longer measured by the fatigue of manual effort, but by the precision with which one steers technological instruments toward juridical truth.

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