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Daftar Isi (Table of Content)

Journal of Government & Civil Society

169 – 190	From Data Visualization to Institutional Sequence: Dashboard Governance and Vertical Accountability in Indonesian Local Government Dewi Sekar Kencono^{1,2}, Achmad Djunaedi³, Yuyun Purbokusumo⁴ <i>(¹ Department of Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia; Department of Government Affairs and Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, Indonesia)</i> <i>(² Department of Architecture and Planning, Faculty of Engineering, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia)</i> <i>(³ Department of Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia)</i>
191 – 214	Implementing Population Administration Policy in Border Regions: Evidence from the Indonesia–Malaysia Border Imelda Hutasoit¹, Wiwik Roso Sri Rejeki², Arifin Sulaeman Hutasoit³, Amreylia Irnadianis Hana Saputri⁴ <i>(^{1,2,3,4} Institute of Home Affairs Governance, Indonesia)</i>
215 – 241	Political Party Engagement on Social Media: Trends, Challenges, and Dynamics of Digital Campaigns Akhmad Habibullah¹, Nooraneda Mutalip Laidey², Joseph Moyinoluwa Talabi³, Sylvester Cortes⁴, Aulia Kartika Putri¹ <i>(¹ Government Science Study Program, Universitas Pancasakti Tegal, Indonesia)</i> <i>(² School of Business, Asia Pacific University of Technology and Innovation, Malaysia)</i> <i>(³ Department of Religions and Peace Studies, Lagos State University, Ojo, Nigeria)</i> <i>(⁴ Cebu Technological University, Philippines)</i>
242 – 257	Citizen Trust and Digital Governance Transformation: Ethical Challenges and Artificial Intelligence Governance in the Public Sector Sukwan Hanafi¹, Achmad Nurmandi¹, Herman Lawelai², Muhammad Younus³ <i>(¹ Department of Government Affairs and Administration, Jusuf Kalla School of Government, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia)</i> <i>(² Department of Government Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Buton, Indonesia)</i> <i>(³ Department of Product Research and Software Development, TPL Logistics Pvt Ltd, Karachi, Pakistan)</i>

- Negotiating State and Customary Authority: Hybrid Governance in an Indigenous Village of Eastern Indonesia
- 258 – 281 **Telly Muriany¹, Victor Sanjak Ruhunlela², Ali Roho Talaohu¹, Mohammad Daud Marasabessy¹, Fernandes Simangunson³**
(¹ Government Science Study Program, Universitas Darussalam Ambon, Indonesia)
(² Government Science Study Program, Universitas Pattimura, Indonesia)
(³ Institute of Home Affairs Governance, Indonesia)
- Corruption Network in Bank BJB Advertising Procurement: An NVivo Content Analysis
- 282 – 298 **Raira Chandara Wanda¹, Salahudin², Saiman³**
(^{1,2,3} Magister Government Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang)
- Muslim Students Trust in Government Institutions: The Role of Religiosity, Administrative Transparency, and Public Service Quality in a Muslim-Majority Context
- 299 – 318 **Rahmad Hidayat¹, Muhammad Naim², Cahyadi Kurniawan³**
(¹ Department Public Administration, Universitas Muhammadiyah Mataram, Indonesia)
(² Department Business Administration, Universitas Muhammadiyah Mataram, Indonesia)
(³ Ph.D in Social Science, FESIS, Universiti Muhammadiyah Malaysia, Malaysia)
- Institutional Rightsizing under Fiscal Constraints: Evidence from Regional Government Reform in Indonesia
- 319 – 344 **Petrus Tekege¹, Fernandes Simangunsong¹, Urbanus Wihaiwar¹, Rahayu S. Mistina¹**
(¹ Institute of Home Affairs Governance, Indonesia)
- From Digital Vote Recapitulation to Democratic Legitimacy: Electoral Governance Innovation in Serang Regency, Indonesia
- 345 – 371 **Muhammad Asmawi¹, Martitah², Dani Muhtada²**
(¹ Pancasila and Civic Education, Universitas Banten Jaya, Indonesia)
(² Faculty of Law, Universitas Negeri Semarang, Indonesia)
- Immigration Governance Under Developmental Stress: Policy Implementation and Foreign National Supervision in East Kalimantan
- 372 – 403 **Kus Indarto¹, Paisal Akbar², Andi Luhur Prianto³, Rusliadi⁴**
(¹ Public Administration, Universitas Mulawarman, Indonesia)
(² Government Science Study Program, Universitas Mulawarman, Indonesia)
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Corruption Network in Bank BJB Advertising Procurement: An NVivo Content Analysis

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Abstract

Corruption in public procurement remains a major governance challenge due to the complex interactions among political, bureaucratic, and economic actors. However, studies examining corruption as an organized network are still limited. This study analyzes the configuration and mechanisms of the alleged corruption network in the Bank BJB advertising procurement case using qualitative content analysis. Eight news reports from Kompas, Tempo, and Republika were analyzed using NVivo 14 through Hierarchy Chart, Project Map, Hierarchical Cluster Analysis, and Crosstab Query. The findings show that the corruption network was sustained by patronage, mutual benefit relationships, brokers, and informal networks, enabling procurement capture, public resource manipulation, fictitious projects, collusion, and abuse of authority. These practices not only caused state financial losses but also weakened governance through policy distortion, reduced oversight, and declining accountability. This study contributes to corruption network research by demonstrating how actor configurations and relational mechanisms sustain organized corruption and offers insights for strengthening transparency, accountability, and public procurement governance.

Keywords: Corruption network, public procurement, state capture, elite actors, public governance

Abstrak

Korupsi dalam pengadaan publik tetap menjadi tantangan tata kelola utama karena interaksi kompleks antara aktor politik, birokrasi, dan ekonomi. Namun, studi yang meneliti korupsi sebagai jaringan terorganisir masih terbatas. Studi ini menganalisis konfigurasi dan mekanisme jaringan korupsi yang diduga dalam kasus pengadaan iklan Bank BJB menggunakan analisis konten kualitatif. Delapan laporan berita dari Kompas, Tempo, dan Republika dianalisis menggunakan NVivo 14 melalui Hierarchy Chart, Project Map, Hierarchical Cluster Analysis, dan Crosstab Query. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa jaringan korupsi didukung oleh patronase, hubungan saling menguntungkan, broker, dan jaringan informal, memungkinkan penangkapan pengadaan, manipulasi sumber daya publik, proyek fiktif, kolusi, dan penyalahgunaan kekuasaan. Praktik-praktik ini tidak hanya menyebabkan kerugian keuangan negara tetapi juga melemahkan tata kelola melalui distorsi kebijakan, pengurangan pengawasan, dan penurunan akuntabilitas. Studi ini berkontribusi pada penelitian jaringan korupsi dengan menunjukkan bagaimana konfigurasi aktor dan mekanisme relasional mempertahankan korupsi terorganisir serta memberikan wawasan untuk memperkuat transparansi, akuntabilitas, dan tata kelola pengadaan publik.

Kata Kunci: Jaringan korupsi, pengadaan umum, penangkapan negara, aktor elit, tata kelola publik

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INTRODUCTION

The procurement of government goods and services is one of the main instruments in the administration of government because it is a mechanism to allocate public resources to support development, provision of public services, and improve community welfare. The large value of the budget managed, the complexity of the procurement process, and the involvement of various stakeholders make the sector vulnerable to various forms of irregularities, including corruption, collusion, conflicts of interest, and abuse of authority (Fazekas & Kocsis, 2020; Jiménez et al., 2022). The development of corrupt practices in public procurement shows that corruption is no longer understood as an act carried out individually, but involves the interaction of various actors who have an interest in obtaining or maintaining access to public resources (Wang, 2020). The complexity of this relationship makes corruption develop as part of governance issues that involve formal and informal relationships between political actors, bureaucracy, and the private sector (Pujileksono & Siregar, 2022).

In Indonesia, weaknesses in the supervisory system, high discretion of public officials, patronage relationships, and low transparency open up space for the formation of collaborative relationships between government officials and private sector actors in controlling the procurement process (Lyra et al., 2022; Suardi et al., 2024). Indonesia still faces similar problems despite various procurement governance reforms that have been carried out. Data on the enforcement of corruption shows that the procurement of goods and services remains one of the sectors with a high level of vulnerability. The patterns that have emerged in various cases show that corrupt practices generally involve more than one actor from the political, bureaucratic, and private sector environments so that they form mutually supportive relationships in controlling the procurement process (Suardi et al., 2024). This condition shows that procurement corruption can not only be understood as a violation of regulations, but also as a governance issue that involves relationships between actors in accessing and distributing public resources.

Regional development banks (Bank Pembangunan Daerah/BPD) provide an important institutional context for understanding governance and political-economic relationships at the subnational level. As regional-owned enterprises (BUMD), BPDs operate with a dual role: they function as commercial banking institutions while also supporting regional development and public interests. Previous research on BPD governance shows that these institutions are influenced not only by internal corporate actors but also by the broader legal, social, and political environment in which they operate. This institutional position may create tensions between commercial objectives and regional development interests and makes the governance of BPDs closely connected to the wider political and institutional context (Umanto et al., 2015). Research on Indonesian BUMDs further indicates that regional enterprises may be exposed to political intervention involving regional political actors and

organizational decision-making (Fahruh et al., 2026). This institutional structure also creates potential channels through which political interests may influence corporate decision-making, including procurement and internal oversight. As regional governments hold ownership interests in BPDs, political influence may operate through formal ownership relationships as well as informal networks involving political and organizational actors. Such influence can affect procurement-related decisions when formal corporate procedures are shaped by external interests, while the effectiveness of board oversight may depend on the independence and capacity of internal governance mechanisms to scrutinize these decisions.

In the context of government procurement of goods and services, previous research has shown that corrupt practices develop through various forms of collaborative relationships between public officials and private sector actors. Jiang and Zhang (2020) explain that procurement corruption can develop through extra-legal governance mechanisms, in which informal relationships begin to replace formal procedures in the decision-making process. These findings are consistent with Waxenecker and Prell (2024) who show that repeated interactions can build trust between actors, making collusion and manipulation easier to sustain in the distribution of public contracts. Meanwhile, Abioro (2021) found that conflicts of interest, collusion, abuse of authority, and manipulation of procurement processes are recurring patterns across cases of public procurement corruption. Overall, these studies show that corrupt practices in public procurement develop through organized relationships, rather than solely as a result of procedural violations by individuals.

Diviák and Lord (2022) explained that corruption networks are generally built through relationships that allow the exchange of information, resources, and protection between actors so that corrupt practices can take place in a sustainable manner. In line with that, Jancsics and Costa (2024) conceptualize corruption as an organizational phenomenon formed through relationships that connect actors across institutional boundaries. Meanwhile, Lindberg et al. (2022) show that patronage and clientelism can strengthen relational ties among actors, allowing corruption networks to persist despite the presence of formal oversight mechanisms. However, clientelism should not be understood only through the traditional patron-client model. Traditional patron-client relationships are generally characterized by direct personal ties, reciprocal obligations, and relatively stable exchanges between patrons and clients. In contrast, professionalized clientelism may operate through broader and more institutionalized networks involving brokers, political elites, bureaucratic actors, and private-sector intermediaries, where access to resources, contracts, and institutional positions can sustain reciprocal relationships (Bektas, 2025). This distinction is relevant to the present study because the Bank BJB case involves patronage and brokerage connecting political, bureaucratic, and economic actors within procurement-related interactions. Taken together, these studies indicate that the persistence of corrupt practices is shaped not only by individual power but also by the configuration of relationships that facilitate coordination and the distribution of interests among actors.

Existing studies have provided important insights into the mechanisms and relational dimensions of corruption, but the institutional context in which these relationships operate remains insufficiently examined. At the subnational level, existing research has shown that procurement processes can be shaped by interactions among political elites, public officials, and business actors, particularly where local political networks influence government projects and procurement decisions (Abigail, 2026; Mustafa, 2017). However, these studies provide limited explanation of how such cross-sectoral relationships are organized and sustained within specific institutional settings of subnational procurement. This limitation is particularly important when procurement is conducted within regional institutions that combine public ownership, commercial objectives, and political interests. Accordingly, this study focuses not only on identifying the actors involved, but also on examining relationship structures, interaction patterns, and mechanisms through which corrupt practices are organized and sustained (Diviák & Lerner, 2025; Jancsics & Costa, 2024).

Based on these gaps, this study aims to analyze the configuration of the corruption network in the alleged corruption case involving the procurement of Bank BJB's advertising placement services, with particular attention to the relationships among political, bureaucratic, and economic elites. The study contributes by connecting the relational perspective of corruption networks with the institutional context of subnational procurement, thereby examining how political, bureaucratic, and economic actors interact within a regional financial institution. The study further contributes empirically by showing how informal relationships among political, bureaucratic, and economic actors can shape procurement practices within a regional financial institution and create challenges for institutional accountability and public oversight.

Based on the above discussion, this study addresses the following research questions: (1) How are political, bureaucratic, and economic actors connected in the alleged corruption case involving Bank BJB's advertising placement procurement? (2) What mechanisms enable these actors to coordinate and sustain the corruption network in the procurement process? and (3) How does the configuration of the corruption network affect public resource control, procurement governance, and institutional accountability?

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses a qualitative approach with content analysis to gain an in-depth understanding of the configuration of the corruption network in the case of alleged corruption in the procurement of advertising placement services for the West Java and Banten Regional Development Bank (Bank BJB) (Fazeli et al., 2023). The qualitative approach was chosen because it is able to explain the dynamics of inter-stakeholder relations, coordination mechanisms, and the context behind the formation of corruption networks that cannot be understood only through a quantitative approach (Qomaruddin & Sa'diyah, 2024). Qualitative

content analysis allows the study to systematically identify, categorize, and interpret recurring meanings, relationships, and patterns across textual sources concerning the case.

The study uses secondary textual data obtained from news reports published by three national media outlets, namely Kompas, Tempo, and Republika, concerning the alleged corruption case involving Bank BJB's advertising placement procurement. The corpus consisted of eight news reports, comprising four reports from Kompas, three from Tempo, and one from Republika, published between 13 March 2025 and 8 July 2026. The reports were identified through targeted searches of Kompas, Tempo, and Republika using the search term "kasus korupsi iklan Bank BJB". Reports were included when they directly addressed the Bank BJB advertising procurement case and contained substantive information relevant to the identification of actors, relationships, corruption mechanisms, or the use and control of public resources. Reports that did not contain substantive information related to the case were excluded from the analytical corpus. The unit of analysis consisted of relevant textual segments or verbatim excerpts from the selected news reports that contained information related to actors, relationships, corruption mechanisms, control of public resources, and the consequences of the alleged corruption.

Data analysis was conducted using NVivo 14 to support systematic data management, coding, and interpretation. The first stage involved data familiarization through repeated reading of the selected documents to develop an understanding of the case context and the information contained in the textual data. The subsequent coding process was guided by the conceptual categories developed from the corruption network and elite capture perspectives. Relevant textual segments were coded according to categories concerning actors, relationships, capture mechanisms, control of public resources, forms of corrupt practices, networks of power, and impacts. Each relevant excerpt was assigned to the category that best represented its substantive meaning, while similar codes were consolidated to reduce redundancy and maintain consistency across the dataset.

To distinguish Political Exchange from Transactional Politics in the coding process, Political Exchange was coded when the data indicated reciprocal exchanges involving political influence, access, support, or other non-monetary resources among actors. In contrast, Transactional Politics was coded when the exchange involved an explicit or identifiable quid pro quo in which political or administrative decisions were connected to specific benefits or returns. This distinction was applied consistently during the NVivo coding process to minimize conceptual overlap between the two categories. Where a passage contained elements of both categories, the coding was determined based on the dominant relational mechanism described in the source.

Table 1. Coding Framework for the Analysis

Main category	Operational coding focus
Elite Actors	References identifying political, bureaucratic, or economic actors and their respective roles in the procurement process.
The Network	References indicating mutual-benefit relationships, patronage, brokerage, or other relational ties connecting actors.
Capture	References indicating informal networking, collusion, or abuse of authority that may influence formal procurement or decision-making processes.
Forms of Corruption	References describing fictitious projects, collusion, rent-seeking, abuse of authority, or other identified corrupt practices.
Public Resources	References concerning budget allocation, policy decisions, procurement mechanisms, or access and control over public resources.
Networks of Power	References indicating the distribution and exercise of influence, authority, access, or control among connected actors.
Impact	References describing state financial losses, weakened oversight, governance problems, or other consequences associated with the alleged corruption.

NVivo 14 was used to organize the coded data and examine relationships among actors through coding queries, matrix coding queries, relationship coding, and qualitative data visualization. These functions were used to support the interpretation of recurring interaction patterns rather than to calculate formal network statistics. The analysis was conducted iteratively by comparing coded segments across documents to identify recurring relationship patterns, the roles of actors, and mechanisms through which corrupt practices were organized in the procurement process. To strengthen the credibility and consistency of the analysis, coded segments were reviewed iteratively, and similar or overlapping codes were consolidated throughout the coding process. Coding consistency was further maintained through repeated review of the coding structure, consolidation of redundant nodes, and documentation of coding decisions in the NVivo project. Findings were also compared across the three media sources to identify consistent patterns and discrepancies in the representation of actors, relationships, and corruption mechanisms. Source triangulation was also supported by comparison with the official KPK investigation statement concerning the Bank BJB advertising procurement case, which was used as supplementary evidence rather than as part of the primary analytical corpus (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 2025). The coding and analytical decisions were documented within the NVivo project to maintain an auditable record of the coding process and support consistency in the interpretation of the data.

RESULT, DISCUSSION, AND ANALYSIS

Configuration of Actors in the Bank BJB Corruption Network

The hierarchy chart analysis reveals that the alleged corruption network in Bank BJB's advertising procurement involves multiple forms of corrupt practices with implications for organizational governance and public resource management.




Figure 1. Hierarchy Chart of Bank BJB Corruption Network

Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the main analytical themes identified in the alleged corruption network surrounding Bank BJB's advertising procurement. The coding identifies six major analytical themes: Elite Actors, The Network, Capture, Forms of Corruption, Public Resources, and Impact, with Elite Actors representing the most prominent theme in the dataset. The distribution of these themes indicates that the alleged corruption extends beyond administrative irregularities in the procurement process, involving interconnected actors, relational mechanisms, control over public resources, forms of corrupt practices, and consequences for governance. Within the Elite Actors theme, three main groups of actors are identified: political elites, bureaucratic elites, and economic elites.

The findings indicate that the alleged corruption involved interactions among elite groups with different forms of authority, political influence, and economic interests. The coding indicates differentiated roles across these groups: political elites are associated with political influence over decision-making, bureaucratic elites with administrative authority in the procurement process, and economic elites with access to procurement-related benefits. The interaction among these groups suggests a pattern of complementary roles through which political influence, administrative authority, and economic interests become connected within the alleged corruption network.

The Network theme comprises three main relational patterns: mutual benefit, patronage, and brokerage. The presence of mutual-benefit relationships indicates that interactions within the network involve exchanges of interests among actors. These exchanges are further associated with patronage relationships, while brokers connect political, bureaucratic, and economic actors within the network. The broker role facilitates communication and coordination across these groups, allowing interests to be connected without requiring direct interaction among all actors.

The Capture theme comprises three main mechanisms: informal networking, collusion among actors, and abuse of authority. The findings indicate that informal relationships are an important mechanism through which actors coordinate outside formal institutional procedures. Informal relationships may facilitate coordination among actors, while collusive interactions can influence procurement decisions toward particular interests. Abuse of authority may provide administrative support for decisions that are influenced by informal relationships and collusive interactions. In terms of Forms of Corruption, the coding identifies fictitious projects, abuse of authority, collusion, and rent-seeking practices as the main forms of corrupt practices found in the dataset. The presence of fictitious projects indicates that irregularities may occur not only during supplier selection but also in the planning and implementation of activities that appear administratively legitimate but may not correspond to their actual implementation. This pattern suggests that relationships among actors may extend across different stages of the procurement process, allowing corrupt practices to be connected to procurement planning and implementation.

The Public Resources theme indicates that the alleged corruption network involves not only financial interests but also relationships concerning budget allocation, policy decisions, and procurement mechanisms. These findings indicate that public resources constitute an important area of interaction among actors within the alleged corruption network. Controls over budget allocation and policy decisions may provide actors with continued access to procurement opportunities while reducing the space for transparent and competitive procedures. This pattern suggests that control over public resources is closely connected to the maintenance of relationships and access within the alleged corruption network.

The Impact theme identifies four main consequences associated with the alleged corruption: state financial losses, public policy distortions, weakened oversight functions, and the persistence of systemic corruption. These findings indicate that the consequences of the alleged corruption extend beyond financial losses to broader dimensions of governance. Policy distortions may shift public decision-making away from broader public interests, while weakened oversight can create opportunities for corrupt practices to persist within governance processes. Taken together, these consequences indicate that the alleged corruption has implications not only for the management of public funds but also for the institutional capacity to maintain accountable procurement and oversight.

Overall, the findings indicate that alleged corruption case involving Bank BJB's advertising procurement is characterized by interconnected relationships among political, bureaucratic,

and economic actors. These findings further suggest that the alleged corruption is shaped by relationships among actors rather than by isolated individual actions. Thus, the configuration of relationships among actors provides important basis for understanding how procurement processes and access to public resources were shaped within the alleged corruption case.

These findings are in line with the research of Luna-Pla and Nicolás-Carlock (2020) who describe corruption as a phenomenon that can develop through relational structures facilitating coordination, information exchange, and resource distribution among actors. The findings also align with Olasolo et al. (2025) who conceptualize corruption as an organizational phenomenon shaped by relationships across actors rather than by individual behavior alone. The presence of patronage relationships and informal networking in the Bank BJB case is also consistent with Kurniawan (2025) findings on the role of patronage in maintaining relationships and continuity within corruption networks. In the Bank BJB case, however, the findings extend these discussions by indicating that the relational mechanisms identified in the network are connected not only to procurement-related interactions but also to budget allocation, policy decisions, and access to public resources. Taken together, these findings contribute to the study of corruption networks by highlighting how relational mechanisms in public procurement can be connected to broader patterns of power relations and governance.

Relationships Among Analytical Dimensions in the Bank BJB Corruption Network

Figure 2 presents a qualitative visualization of the relationships among the analytical dimensions identified in the study using the Project Map feature in NVivo 14. The visualization indicates that Elite Actors, The Network, Capture, Forms of Corruption, Public Resources, and Impact are interconnected analytical dimensions rather than isolated themes.




Figure 2. Qualitative Visualization of Relationships Among Analytical Dimensions in the Bank BJB Corruption Network

The visualization highlights the connections among Elite Actors, The Network, and Capture as a central relational pattern in the analytical framework. This relational pattern connects the presence of elite actors with network mechanisms such as patronage, mutual-benefit relationships, and brokerage, which are associated with the Capture dimension in the analytical framework. In this sense, the visualization suggests that procurement-related interactions are connected to informal relationships involving political, bureaucratic, and economic actors.

The visualization also connects the Capture dimension with Public Resources and Forms of Corruption. These connections suggest that the Capture dimension links the network of actors with issues concerning the allocation and use of public resources. The connections further indicate that informal relationships and abuse of authority are associated with issues of budget allocation, policy decisions, and procurement mechanisms. This connections are also associated with the forms of corrupt practices identified in the data, including fictitious projects, collusion, abuse of authority, and rent-seeking practices. Thus, the forms of corruption identified in this study can be understood in relation to the connections among actors, capture mechanisms, and public resource-related dimensions shown in Figure 2.

The connection between Public Resources and Impact indicates that issues concerning public resource control are associated with consequences extending beyond state financial losses. The connection between Public Resources and Impact is also reflected in consequences such as financial losses, public policy distortions, weakened oversight mechanisms, and the persistence of corrupt practices. These connections indicate that the impacts identified in the study are linked to the broader relationships among actors, capture mechanisms, and the control of public resources. Overall, the relationship pattern shown in Figure 2 indicates that the analytical dimensions form an interconnected framework rather than operating as isolated elements. The connections among actors, network mechanisms, capture, forms of corruption, public resources, and impacts provide a relational basis for understanding the alleged corruption in Bank BJB's advertising procurement.

These findings are consistent with the corruption network perspective, which views corruption as a relational phenomenon shaped by interactions among multiple actors. Yu et al. (2020) explain that relationships among actors can form network structures that facilitate coordination, resource exchange, and mutual protection within corruption networks. Meanwhile, Silitonga et al. (2023) emphasize that corruption networks can function as informal organizational structures connecting actors across institutions through exchanges of interests and resources. The findings of this study extend these perspectives by showing that the relationships among analytical dimensions in the Bank BJB case encompass not only interactions among actors but also connections with procurement processes, public resources, and governance-related impacts.

Thematic Clustering in the Bank BJB Corruption Network

Figure 3 presents the results of a hierarchical cluster analysis conducted to examine similarities among the analytical themes based on coding patterns. In the dendrogram, themes positioned closer together indicate greater similarity in their coding patterns. Thus, the cluster analysis identifies groups of themes that share similar coding patterns within the analytical framework.




Figure 3. Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of Themes in the Bank BJB Corruption Network

The hierarchical cluster analysis groups The Network, Economic Elite, Political Elite, Bureaucratic Elite, and Informal Networking within the same cluster based on similarities in their coding patterns. The clustering of these themes indicates that actor-related dimensions share similar coding patterns within the corruption network identified in the Bank BJB case. The clustering of Political Elite, Bureaucratic Elite, and Economic Elite reflects similarities in their coding patterns concerning cross-sectoral interactions, including references to authority, resources, and interests. The inclusion of Informal Networking in the same cluster indicates similar coding patterns concerning informal relationships and coordination among actors outside formal procurement mechanisms.

The next cluster groups Collusion, State Collusion, Patronage, Capture, and Brokerage based on similarities in their coding patterns. The clustering of these themes reflects similar coding patterns concerning collusion, patronage, brokerage, and capture mechanisms within the alleged corruption network. The clustering also brings together references to brokerage and patronage, which in the coded data are associated with connections among political, bureaucratic, and economic interests and with the maintenance of relationships within the network. The clustering of collusion with patronage, brokerage, and capture indicates that these themes frequently appear within related coding patterns in the analyzed data. The cluster analysis also groups Procurement Control and Weakening of Governance based on similarities in their coding patterns. The clustering of these themes indicates that Procurement Control and Weakening of Governance share related coding patterns concerning procurement processes and governance conditions. The related coding patterns also include references to transparency, accountability, and competition in relation to procurement control and governance conditions. The clustering also places Weakening of Governance in relation to references to supervisory functions and abuse of authority within the coded data.

In other cluster groups bring together Rent-Seeking, Forms of Corruption, State Losses, Policy Setting, Public Policy Distortions, and Abuse of Authority based on similarities in their coding patterns. The clustering of these themes reflects related coding patterns concerning forms of corruption, abuse of authority, policy setting, and procurement processes. The clustering also reflects coding patterns concerning rent-seeking, access to public resources, and abuse of authority in relation to policy and procurement processes. These coding patterns are also associated with references to state losses and public policy distortions within the analyzed data. The analysis also groups Public Resources, Mutual Benefit Relationship, Budget Distribution, and Fictitious Projects based on similarities in their coding patterns.

The clustering of these themes reflects related coding patterns concerning public resources, mutual-benefit relationships, budget distribution, and fictitious projects. The clustering also associates Budget Distribution and Fictitious Projects with coding patterns concerning public resource allocation and relationships among actors. Thus, the clustering indicates that budget management is discussed in the coded data alongside administrative processes and informal relationships among actors. This interpretation is also supported by the official KPK investigation statement issued on 13 March 2025. The statement reported alleged irregularities in the procurement of Bank BJB's advertising services, including the alleged arrangement of vendors and procedural violations in the procurement process. KPK also reported a difference between payments received by advertising agencies and payments made to media outlets, providing official supporting evidence for the findings concerning procurement control, public resource management, and alleged corruption mechanisms.

Overall, the hierarchical cluster analysis identifies several groups of themes that share similar coding patterns in the Bank BJB corruption case. The identified clusters encompass themes related to inter-stakeholder relationships, collusion mechanisms, procurement control, abuse of authority, and governance-related impacts. The clustering patterns highlight the co-occurrence of themes concerning actor coordination, informal relationships, and public resource management within the analyzed data. These findings are consistent with the corruption network perspective, which views corruption as a phenomenon shaped by relationships among multiple actors. Fazekas and Wachs (2020) explain that corruption networks involve relational structures that facilitate coordination, protection, and the distribution of benefits among network actors. Pérez-Chiqués and Meza (2021) further emphasize the relevance of informal relationships, brokerage, and patronage in the organization of corrupt networks. The findings of this study extend these perspectives by showing that, in the Bank BJB case, the clustering of themes encompasses not only actor-related relationships but also procurement control, abuse of authority, public resource allocation, and governance-related impacts.

Cross-Source Consistency of Corruption Network Findings

Figure 4 presents the cross-source comparison of coding patterns across three media sources: Kompas, Republika, and Tempo. The comparison allows the consistency of the identified themes to be examined across the three media sources.




Figure 4. Cross-Source Consistency of Corruption Network Findings

The visualization shows that the three media share coding patterns across several major themes, although the frequency of coding varies across some categories. Themes such as Elite Actors, Informal Networking, Mutual-Benefit Relationships, Patronage, Capture, and Fictitious Projects are coded across all three media sources. This recurrence of these themes across the three sources indicates that similar aspects of the alleged corruption network are represented in the coded media reports. The coding patterns indicate that Tempo contains more coding related to Informal Networking, Elite Actors, and relationships among actors, while Kompas shows greater coding emphasis on Mutual-Benefit Relationships, Patronage, and governance-related themes. Meanwhile, Republika shows coding related to Economic Elite, Political Elite, and the relationship between procurement and public resource management. These differences indicate variation in the distribution of coding across the three media sources, while the recurring themes remain present across the dataset.

The cross-source comparison indicates that the three media contain recurring coding related to political, bureaucratic, and economic actors in the procurement of Bank BJB's advertising placement services. The variation across sources therefore reflects differences in the distribution of coded themes rather than the absence of recurring themes across the dataset. This cross-source consistency supports the identification of recurring corruption-network themes across multiple media sources. From a methodological perspective, the Crosstab Query provides a basis for comparing coding patterns across sources as part of the source triangulation process (Tzagkarakis & Kritas, 2023). The recurrence of the main themes across the three media indicates that similar coding patterns are present across multiple sources rather than being limited to a single document. Thus, the interpretation of actor configurations, network mechanisms, forms of corruption, and governance-related impacts is supported by recurring coding patterns across multiple media sources.

These findings are consistent with Morgan (2022) that document-based research requires cross-source comparisons to reduce potential information bias and improve interpretation reliability. In public procurement corruption research, comparing multiple sources can provide a broader view of actor relationships than relying on a single document. Research on network-based procurement corruption also highlights the value of integrating multiple information sources to identify recurring patterns of relationships among actors.

CONCLUSIONS

This study shows that the alleged corruption in the procurement of Bank BJB's advertising placement services is better understood as a relational network involving political, bureaucratic, and economic actors rather than as an isolated individual act. The analysis of eight news reports using NVivo 14 identifies interconnected patterns of elite involvement, patronage, brokerage, mutual-benefit relationships, informal networking, procurement capture, and control over public resources. The findings further indicate that these relational mechanisms are associated

with forms of corruption including collusion, fictitious projects, rent-seeking, and abuse of authority, with consequences for state financial resources, policy integrity, oversight, and governance. The consistency of the main themes across Kompas, Tempo, and Republika further supports the interpretation that the identified patterns are not confined to a single news source.

The contribution of this study lies in applying a corruption network perspective to public procurement in an Indonesian regional banking context through qualitative content analysis and NVivo 14. The findings suggest that corruption prevention requires not only individual-level law enforcement but also institutional measures addressing the relational and organizational conditions that enable corrupt practices. From a policy perspective, regional banking enterprises require stronger controls over procurement and promotional expenditure, including conflict-of-interest disclosure, independent review of high-value procurement and advertising contracts, external financial oversight, and stronger board-level scrutiny of procurement-related decisions. Future research may complement media-based content analysis with court records, interviews, or Social Network Analysis to examine actor relationships and corruption mechanisms more comprehensively.

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