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Diffusion of Ideology and Role of Local Party Control to Understand Aceh Post-War

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ABSTRACT

The goal of this research is to investigate the role of ideological diffusion in the establishment and maintenance of GAM's political hegemony following the 2005-2020 Aceh War, as well as to determine how the practice of command and control is reflected when GAM works in political parties. Gramsci's theory of hegemony is used to dissect the phenomenon of post-conflict ideological diffusion. GAM's main strategy for winning elections while maintaining community support is ideological diffusion. This study employs a qualitative method with a case study approach, and data is gathered through in-depth interviews with GAM as well as journals, books, and articles in print and online. The result shows that the GAM ideology, which has diffuse, can be used by local political actors as a political strategy to gain power in former conflict areas through a balanced hegemonic situation. This study concludes that local political parties that can capitalize on the spread of GAM ideology can exert control over the ongoing political process in legislative and executive institutions. However, as a result of GAM's control over power, conflicts may reoccur. The study of the spread of this ideology can be furthered by looking at the community's resistance to the GAM ideology.

Keywords: Ideological diffusion, GAM, local party, post-war areas

ABSTRAK

Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menggali peran difusi ideologis dalam penciptaan dan pemeliharaan hegemoni politik GAM pasca Perang Aceh 2005-2020 dan untuk mengetahui bagaimana praktik komando dan kontrol tercermin ketika GAM bekerja di partai politik. Teori hegemoni dari Gramsci digunakan dalam membedah fenomena difusi ideology yang terjadi setelah konflik. Difusi ideologi merupakan strategi utama GAM untuk memenangkan pemilu dengan tetap mendapat dukungan politik dari masyarakat. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi kasus dan data penelitian dikumpulkan melalui wawancara mendalam dengan GAM dan melalui jurnal, buku, dan artikel baik cetak maupun online. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa ideologi GAM yang telah mengalami difusi dapat digunakan oleh para aktor politik lokal sebagai strategi politik untuk mendapatkan kekuasaan di daerah bekas konflik melalui situasi hegemoni keseimbangan. Kesimpulan penelitian ini adalah partai politik lokal yang mampu memanfaatkan difusi ideologi GAM dapat mengontrol berlangsungnya proses politik di lembaga legislatif dan lembaga eksekutif. Namun demikian, konsekuensi yang timbul adalah kekuasaan dikontrol oleh GAM dan konflik dapat kembali terjadi. Penelitian tentang difusi ideologi ini dapat dilanjutkan dengan melihat resistensi masyarakat terhadap ideologi GAM.

Kata Kunci: Difusi ideologi, GAM, partai lokal, daerah pasca perang

INTRODUCTION

This paper deals with the role of ideological diffusion in creating and maintaining the political hegemony of resistance groups. Ideology is defined as belief, attitudes, and values (Eagleton, 1991; Lane, 1962; Martin, 2015; Tedin, 1987) and a set of beliefs that explain the world, bind followers and suggest desired activities and outcomes (Brown, 2002; Kissas, 2017). Thus, diffusion of ideology is the event of a shift in the concentration of great ideological understanding within the resistance group to the part that concentrates on how ideology in societymakingde differences in ideological levels in the internal and external spheres (Butler, 2017; Kim, 2001; Poole, 1981).

The study of ideology has talked about beliefs that are the basis of action, regardless of good or bad effects (Eagleton, 1991; Jost, 2006; Martin, 2015; R. Schulze, 1966). Ideology was first popularized by Marx (1927) in *German Ideology* and Karl Mannheim (1929) in *Utopian Ideology* (Bullock and Stallybrass, 1988; Eyerman, 1981; Grayman, Good, & Good, 2009; Larrain, 1979). The core of the book states that a movement with an ideology is capable of giving direction, objectives, and rules in the activities of the movement to those who do not have an ideology. Ideology is also considered to be an adhesive for individuals in the campaign and is used to define organized methods of social action (Fauzan, 2018; Ferguson, 2017; Freedon, 1998; Williams, 2017).

Ideology is essential for a movement group and used as a universal system of thinking. It is believed by fascist and communist groups to be able to explain the future human condition through revolution. For the liberal group, ideology as a belief sysem, is used to regulate a better world. Manheim's theory sees ideology as a worldview to realize the best life (albeit utopia). Some groups see ideology as a way of life that is colored by culture, socie,ty and political life. And this last understanding is the one most widely used by the community (McGrattan, 2016; Rosales, 2016; Wright, 2015; Zorin, 2001).

In classical Marxist theory, Marx, Engels, and Lenin tend to assimilate false consciousness to ideology by referring to writing or various acts of knowledge by intellectuals and capitalists (Eyerman, 1981). Schulze said that ideology is any pattern of belief followed by a group of followers based on a different approach to social reality (R. Schulze, 1966). Namely, when the power of production and division of labor is limited, ideology is the solution to the contradiction (Larrain, 1979). The negative connotation is that ideology is seen as an attempt to hide the social contradictions that support the ruling class as a power class. This is considered dangerous by classical Marxist theory because it is capable of inhibiting the revolutionary consciousness of society (Abercrombie and Turner, 1978).

Geertz has conveyed an ideology with a neutral connotation. According to him, it could be in the form of the theory of interest and the theory of strain (Zorin, 2001). Interest theory ideology sees ideology as a mask and weapon of struggle to make profits, while

the ideological strength theory sees ideology as a symptom and an essential remedy for the correction of socio-psychological imbalances in society (Freeden, 1998; Lane, 1962; Tedin, 1987). For the author to draw up a definition of ideology, a set of beliefs that are based on the actions of a person, a group of parties, or countries used by humans to establish, explain and define the objectives and methods of organized social action. There are three points of view in the form of ideology: (1) the conceptual ideology, (2) the ideology to maintain or change the socio-political order, and (3) the ideology to cover the structure of domination (Abercrombie and Turner, 1978; Shorten, 2017).

Ideological diffusion derives from the concept of ideology moving, spreading, and then being used as a strategy by local political actors in the ongoing hegemonic web. The process of ideological diffusion is analogous to the movement of dye in water. Colored water moves from high to low potential. As a result, the water in the glass will change color to reddish or according to the color specified. This is because water has less pressure than colored water. Actors with strong ideology colored society's weaker ideology. In this process of ideological diffusion, actors with a strong ideology can influence, spread, and make other actors a part of it through the process of education and care. As a result, the spread of ideology is determined by the decision-making style, the cohesiveness of network members, and the process of idea diffusion (Chisholm, 2013).




Figure 1. Theoretical Propositions
Source: Compiled From Different Sources

Ideology can experience diffusion by moving or spreading within or outside a group. In some areas of conflict, ideology is spread through the adoption of religious values, social conceptions and politics (Freirea, 2015; Sari, 2019). Dominance and ideological hegemony seemed natural when the war took place because of the availability of resources for violence and threats in the community, both the resistance groups and the state. In

the meantime, after the war, power tends to spread, not be seen openly (Ananta, 2007; Grayman et al., 2009; Ichwanuddin, 2018). Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) developed the theory of hegemony in *Prison Notebooks*, which states that the basis of social transformation stems from political initiatives that shift the balance of class power to hegemony (Bates, 1975; Gramsci, 1971). Hegemony must be achieved by intellectual and moral leadership and, according to Gramsci, a combination of coercion and forces only last for a time (Simon, 1982).

Resistance groups occur slowly through the diffusion of ideology, and the goal is to spread ideology efficiently, create a balance of hegemony, and use it as a tool to command and control politics. (Bates, 1975; Freire, 2015; Grayman et al., 2009; McGrattan, 2016; Simon, 1982). Negotiations between different individuals or groups are required during the process to create a common collective consciousness, which is critical in the effort to build and maintain political alliances (Gramsci, 1971). Thus, to succeed in the ongoing power struggle, an actor must first understand and prioritize what the public wants before transforming it into a political product that the public wants (Firmanzah, 2010; Hadiz, 2006; Jainuri, 2010; Kamaruddin, 2003; Michels, 1984).

Many studies show that ideology is the catalyst for the emergence of armed conflict in many countries. However, the study of ideology is still a newcomer theory in conflict research, and it has not been widely recognized as an important determinant and used in analyzing the effects of post-war ideology. In reality, ideology is more than just an idealistic political program pursued while ignoring strategic interests; it can also be used to shape political actors' understanding of security, strategy, and power politics in post-conflict areas. One strategy that followed the conflict was to form political parties to avoid political exclusion and marginalization and the emergence of new potential conflicts (Nur & Susanto, 2020). The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador and the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) in Mozambique are examples of a rebel movement that is turning into a political party. In Indonesia, conflicts that could eventually be resolved in Papua and Aceh also called for the existence of local political parties. But until now, only Aceh has local political parties. After the 2005 peace agreement, the ideology of the Independent Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia struggle appears to be used by local parties, such as the Aceh Party, to carry out political marketing. Ideology is used not only as a basis for political parties but also as a strategy to win elections. Successful political parties are those that can use ideology as a political marketing strategy (Ansori, 2012; Hamid, 2005; Nurhasim, 2012).

After the conflict, the phenomenon of ideological diffusion in society became more prevalent. The reasons for this are, first, the GAM resistance groups (tried) to open themselves up to groups outside themselves, second, the insistence on GAM's internal needs to protect GAM's interests, which are seen to be more important than arrogant;

third, the main reason for the spread of GAM 's ideology to engage in local politics is as a tool for controlling the economy (Budi, 2012; Hamid, 2005; Nurhasim, 2012). For example, the Central Government rejected the GAM flag proposal, which was considered to be unique to GAM and not following the principle of the integration agreement. Finally, this GAM group changed the flag by removing the star moon and changing the black-and-white line that has historical value because it was Hasan Tiro who carved it as proof of the relationship between Aceh and Turkey when they cooperated against the Portuguese occupation. The GAM group's adaptable attitude aims to protect their interests. The spread of ideology through peaceful means allows ideology to enter the socio-political system in society without resistance. Especially when the Aceh Party invited influential figures from the Aceh War, such as Muzakir Manaf, the leader of GAM, to participate in the campaigns of promoted candidates (Budi, 2012; Nurhasim, 2003).

This research was carried out in Aceh, Indonesia, to help illustrate other areas of conflict that, after the end of the conflict, rebel ideologies did not directly disappear and could be diffused into new forms, such as political parties. This paper seeks to find out the role of ideological diffusion in the creation and maintenance of political hegemony and how the practice of command and control is reflected in the political behavior of the rebel (GAM) in political parties. After the conflict and the war ended, did the ideology of the GAM disappear? Or is it still there but to change into a new form? How ideology is spread across political parties will be discussed in the next section.

RESEARCH METHOD

To examine the impact of ideological diffusion on post-conflict local parties, this study employs a qualitative approach with a case study approach (Yin, 2003). The study was carried out in Aceh, Indonesia, through observation and in-depth interviews with predetermined sources, including (1) local political actors, (2) former GAM combatants, and (3) the community. Resource persons are chosen based on their knowledge of ideology and their previous interactions with GAM. Furthermore, research data was gathered from relevant documents and literature. The collected interview data and documents are then selected and classified based on the needs of the research. The data was then analyzed by reducing it, presenting it, and drawing conclusions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The long history of the insurgent struggle has influenced the shift in the ideology that this group believes in, namely the Free Aceh Movement in Aceh (Grayman et al., 2009; Miller, 2009; Reid, 2006). There have been at least three times the ideological change that the group has undergone and believed to have existed since it was first established (1953) until now (2020). First, the Islamic ideology is chosen by the leader of the resistance group

to unite the followers of the group (Morris, 1983; Siapno, 2002; Yunanto, 2003). Robinson sees certain aspects of Islamic ideology, especially those that emphasize brotherhood, unity, and solidarity, which have a significant influence on separatism in the thinking of Islamic minority groups (Hadiz, 2019; Hefner, 2000; Morris, 1983; Robison, 1988). In fact, the same ideas can also be mobilized to fight separatist views in the Islamic realm. Islamic ideology inhibits the development of separatist nationalism, and provides an ideological justification for the upheaval (Aspinall, 2008; Chaidar, 2000; Kell, 1995; K. Schulze, 2003). Like the case of the rise of Darul Islam in Aceh. The Islamic ideology, led by Daud Beureueh Aceh (1953), was able to mobilize the public against the government. Islamic identity is contrary to Indonesia 's ideology, namely Pancasila (Jamil, Jauhari, & Dahlan, 2019). Because it is secular and not in accordance with Islamic ideology, resulting in rebellion. Then, after various security and negotiation measures, an agreement was reached in May 1959 that made Aceh an autonomous region in terms of religion, customary law and education (El Ibrahimy, 2001).




Figure 2: The Ideological Change of Aceh
Source: (Aspinall, 2008; Chaidar, 2000; Damanik, 2010)

Second, Aceh's ideology of secular nationalism is an ideology that dominates the determination of the desires of different individuals in society in one (authoritarian) will. The strongest feature of this ideology is not only coercion, but also the assertion that they are the only legitimate articulators and defenders of the public interest because the ideology of GAM is a form of nationalism and national liberation. Hasan Tiro said, "Free my people from foreign domination, from Javanese colonialism" (Damanik, 2010; K. Schulze, 2003). The underlying ideology is ethnicity and is very exclusive because it exists as a reaction to the modernization of the Indonesian nation's development project. If Islamic-based ideology promotes religious virtues, secular-nationalist ideology is to pursue economic

development (Brown, 2002). The four critical elements of this ideology are: (1) the revival of Aceh's identity and history; (2) anti-Javanese and anti-Indonesian sentiments were articulated as anti-colonialism; (3) anti-capitalism; and (4) Islam.

This shift in ideology is inseparable from the effort to revive Aceh's identity. It is characterized by the reinforcement of Aceh's symbols, such as the raising of the Aceh flag in the Aceh declaration of independence every 4 December as a form of resistance to government control, described by the insurgents as the exploitation of the Javanese who stole property. Stealing livelihoods and putting the Acehnese people in chains of tyranny, poverty, and neglect, because the core of secular-nationalist ideology was aimed at making Aceh free (Grayman et al., 2009). In the late 1970s, the GAM ideology also included anti-capitalist and anti-Western elements, especially foreign companies that exploited Aceh's natural resources, such as Arun natural gas, which the resistance saw as supporting the government in Jakarta (Aspinall, 2007).

The shift in the ideology of the resistance group has been detected very clearly from Islam to secular-nationalist (commonly known as ethno-nationalism) Aceh, anti-Indonesia, and anti-Javanese, then also anti-capitalist and anti-Western (Miller, 2009). The process of political maturation by resistance groups (GAMs) is somewhat similar to the national liberation movements in other parts of the country. For example, the Provisional Army of the Republic of Ireland (IRA), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), or the African National Congress (ANC), which in the 1970s and 1980s supported radical socialists and anti-Western Marxist ideas even though it is finally re-experiencing the shift after moving towards the mainstream of politics through leadership maturity. Like the ANC and the PLO that have become new governments in South Africa and Palestine. Likewise, GAM in Aceh experienced an ideological shift due to changes in the global ideological environment that can not be ignored (Aspinall, 2009; Budi, 2012; Sindre, 2010; Stange, 2010; Waizenegger & Hyndman, 2010).

Third, a mixed ideology between secularism and Islam that gives priority to the struggle for prosperity. After the peace agreement was signed in August 2005. On the basis of an agreement, GAM is required to release its attributes and to forget its ideology. The benefits of peace for GAM are welfare through the formation of political parties, a position in government, and full control of the economy in Aceh (Hadiz, 2006; Ichwanuddin, 2018; Nurhasim, 2009; Ridhwan, M, 2015; Zainal, 2017). When moving from combat troops to politics, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) initially used the name of the GAM Party and retained the symbol of the former separatist movement. Then a number of protests came because GAM was seen as not committed to the peace process or Indonesian unity. Eventually, the name and symbol were changed to Aceh Party while maintaining the color and design of the flag so that still be recognized by GAM supporter.

The Flag of GAM	The Flag of Aceh Party
	

Figure 3: Transformation of the Flag
Source: Aceh Transition Committee (2020)

After the conflict, GAM, as a member of the Aceh Party, held 81 seats in the provincial parliament (2019-2024) and became mayor in 11 districts / cities from 23 regions in Aceh. For example, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Aceh Timur, Aceh Utara, Nagan Raya, Gayo Lues, Simeulue, Pidie Jaya, Sabang, Lhokseumawe, and Langsa. In Aceh Jaya, the Aceh Party offered a populism program favored by the community. Among them, the Aceh Party promised to provide education money, money for the dead (mourning money), and electricity money for the poor, whereas in Sabang City, Aceh was promised a program to help with child money, gas money, electricity money, dead money, and other money. In fact, the Aceh Party also claims to be the only party concerned with the education of the younger generation. Nazarudin, Chairman of the Aceh Regional Leadership Council (DPW-PA) in 2018-2023, said, "Only the Aceh Party cares for the poor. Every year, we give 60 billion to underprivileged people so that our children are smart, so that our children can become scholars". During the campaign promise process, the transfer and diffusion of the ideology of the Aceh Party also occurred between the party and the community.

Poor people who live in remote areas with limited access to information are the primary targets for the spread of GAM ideology. This is effectively used by local parties such as the Aceh Party because this type of community is easy to believe and accepts all information brought to their area by political actors, allowing ideology to spread easily. This situation is exacerbated by a lack of transportation, which makes it difficult for other political actors to reach people in this area. However, unlike the Aceh Party, they have strong human resources and influence in remote areas where they are fighting guerrilla warfare. So, they are slowly in a position to spread ideology peacefully without resistance in society. They tend, in fact, to be respected and exalted.

Table 1. Programs of the Aceh Party When the West Aceh Regent is Elected

No.	Programs of the Aceh Party
1.	Provision of venture capital to the community of 15 million per person
2.	Provide free electricity
3.	Distribution of poor rice is free
4.	Provision of employment opportunities for pesantren teachers will be assisted in teaching at elementary and junior secondary level
5.	Honorary teachers will be appointed as civil servants
6.	Providing scholarships to students for 1,000 people
7.	Providing education funding for children in Islamic boarding schools of one million per person.
8.	Establishing a Muslim village
9.	Joint remembrance and recitation of wirit yasin
10.	Build infrastructure (duafa houses, road repairs)
11.	Improve public health services.

Source: Proposed by Authors Based on Data Analysis

As the results of the above study show, the diffusion of the ideology is the spread of the ideology from people or places that are highly focused on ideological understanding towards low-level groups in society, and this is clearly seen after the conflict. The adaptive attitude of the GAM groups is to protect their interests, because, without political parties, GAM will be left out of power (powerless) so that the presence of local political parties is crucial in the climate of a democratic country such as Indonesia (Lestari, Djatmika, Sumarlam, & Purnanto, 2019). In other words, the process of political adaptation undertaken by the GAM groups is to oversee their unfulfilled demands in the Helsinki's MoU and to fight for their higher interests, namely the establishment of an autonomous regional government in the form of self-government (Aspinall, 2009).

The ideology that is able to reach the community and is attached through a hegemonic process is capable of causing political parties to win elections. This is possible because community support is gathered around the same ideology. Previously, GAM's ideology was limited within the internal organization; however, following the conflict with the modification of the new GAM ideology, mixed ideology (secularism and Islam), GAM attempted to be adaptive and influence the spread of ideology in society. Other ideologies, such as Islam and secular ideologies, have not completely vanished. However, it can be reduced to a bare minimum in accordance with the internal needs of GAM who are members of political parties as well as the needs of the community.

Following the conflict, the Aceh Party emerged as one of the local political parties that was the driving force behind the spread of this ideology in Aceh. This effort was made to ensure that GAM's ideology was not only internalized by GAM members, but also believed by the community. Although the ultimate goal was to win the general election, local Acehese parties went further to hegemony and perpetuate GAM through ideological diffusion that occurred after the conflict (Hamid, 2005). The introduction of GAM ideology initiates the process of ideological diffusion. This process is carried out directly in order to anticipate the situation of rural communities that are uninterested in viewing, reading, and accessing political information via various media. As a result, direct door-to-door introductions are an efficient method of reaching people at all levels of society. The GAM ideology introduced is a populist ideology with the image of being caring, generous, and populist, as well as being from the lower middle class. In order for them to better understand the people's suffering.

Ideological diffusion takes place slowly through a number of opportunities to meet and communicate within the community. Through this process, the Aceh Party is also slowly spreading the ideology of its party to society, which we call the spread of ideology, when ideology is gradually and not suddenly spreading. This gradual spread makes it possible for ideology to enter the social-political system in society without resistance (Budi, 2012; Nurhasim, 2012). An influential figure in the Aceh Party that was highly respected was Muzakir Manaf, one of the leaders of the GAM, who campaigned and influenced the community to elect the Aceh Party.

The process of diffusing the GAM ideology through the Aceh Party is not without obstacles. One of the greatest obstacles was the upheaval due to the unequal distribution of the benefits of special autonomy, which had been dominated by GAM and the Aceh Party. This can happen because the strong ideological hegemony of GAM in the Aceh administration results in domination and at the same time discriminates against non-owners of dominant authority or those who have different political ideologies (Idrus & Purwaningsih, 2016; Jainuri, 2010). The most obvious form of discrimination is the distribution of special autonomy funds and the provision of infrastructure in Aceh, where the factor of closeness to the authority determines the smooth delivery of resources and infrastructure (Dewanta, 2016; Evans, 1995; Kaloh, 2007; Miller, 2009). In particular, the proximity of the ideology which, in turn, gives rise to pathological patterns in government because it does not carry out checks and balances between the executive and the legislative branch (Hajad, 2014; Stange, 2010). What happened was a political treasury to secure each other's political and economic interests. The strong local party hegemony explains the strength of cooperation to protect one another's economic and political affairs while simultaneously demonstrating the weak capacity of the legislative body because most of its members are former warfighters with little education and lack of understanding of government and political administration.

Groups and regions that feel discriminated against have the potential to separate themselves and form self-government. For example, community groups have begun to emerge that want their territory to become their own province, such as the Province of Aceh Lauser Antara (ALA) and the Province of Aceh South West (ABAS). Irwandi, a respected leader of the GAM, was arrested on corruption charges. The government in Aceh is run by Nova Iriasyah, who is often in conflict with GAM leaders, and is considered to be under the control of the central government because it always acts in accordance with the leadership of the central government, not the orders of the dominant ideological hegemon.




Figure 4. Problems With The Implementation of Special Autonomy Due to Control by Local Parties

Soure: Proposed by Authors Based on Data Analysis

The first problem is the national elite as the ruling party (the ruling elite) and the ability to influence politics on a national level. As a result, the normal situation may turn into chaos when political reform is driven by the ruling elite (Nugroho, 2018). Secondly, there are inconsistencies in the regulations due to the dual role of governors in special autonomous regions that cause multi-interpretation and conflict in the region. For example, what happened in Aceh and Papua was overlapping regulations between special laws and general laws. As a result, the rules in force become unclear as they do not have clear legal provisions. As for the unclear rules on the distribution of special autonomy funds in Aceh, which caused a prolonged conflict between the governor and the regents (Ichwanuddin, 2018; Rohmah, 2018; Zainal, 2017).

Thirdly, it relates to institutional capacity, namely where institutions are unable to demonstrate their capacity to perform their duties and authorities, that is to say, the extent to which discretion (breakthrough) is taken by the governor, for example, in the performance of his role, because poor institutional capacity will also affect and cause problems for the governor (Ansori, 2012; Sanogo, 2019). The chaos of governance in Aceh, for example, lies not only in the weakness of the governor as the central authority to implement special autonomy. The delay in governance in Aceh was also due to the relatively low capacity of legislative members to exercise discretionary government control.

Fourth, important control tools for creating harmonious power relations between national governments, governors (provinces) and districts/cities (Argenti, 2018; Masaki, 2007; Nasution, 2017; Sidel, 2005; Zainal, 2017). Indeed, the mechanism of promotion, coordination, and supervision is already part of the regional government regulation clause. The practice of these three things, however, did not go well. This is due to the still low commitment of higher government institutions and the weak capacity of institutions to perform these functions. For example, discrimination in the distribution of special autonomy funds, lack of a leveled development function, placement of officials who do not pay attention to human resources capacity. Even in Aceh, ideological proximity is still a determining factor in the placement of positions within the bureaucracy. For example, the placement of staff who do not pay attention to capacity results in disrupted government functions because the community can not receive the maximum service and ultimately hinders the development process in the area. For example, the placement of teaching staff (teachers) as a sub-district or apparatus in government.

CONCLUSION

Dominance and ideological hegemony seemed easy when the war took place because of the availability of resources for violence and threats in the community, both the resistance groups and the state. The long history of the insurgent struggle has influenced the shift in the ideology that this group believes in, namely the Free Aceh Movement in Aceh. The strongest characteristic of this ideology is not only coercion, but also the assertion that they are the only legitimate articulators and defenders of the public interest. This shift in ideology is inseparable from the effort to revive Aceh's identity and is characterized by the reinforcement of Aceh's symbols, such as the raising of the Aceh flag in the Aceh declaration of independence every 4 December as a form of resistance to government control, described by the insurgents as the exploitation of the Javanese who stole property.

Stealing livelihoods and putting Acehnese in a chain of tyranny, poverty and neglect, because the core of secular nationalist ideology is aimed at liberating Aceh. Although GAM released weapons, attributes and ideologies during the peace agreement, as previously discussed, the ideology of GAM did not necessarily disappear. After peace,

this ideology experiences the spread of highly concentrated people or places to low ideology groups. The Aceh Party, as a local party, is very interesting to observe. Specifically, how this party introduces the ideology, the work program and the party's achievement to the public in order to win the election, because the victory and defeat of political parties is determined by how political parties can carry out their role in political marketing, including in terms of spreading the ideology in society, particularly rural communities that are far from access to information.

For GAM groups, the political struggle is to dominate strategic positions in the government and legislative spheres to continue to exist during of political competition with other political forces. Efforts to seize strategic positions by spreading (diffusion) ideology was seen as the only way for GAM to become a major political force and accepted by all the people of Aceh. In the world of politics and democracy, justice is required, because one way to resolve conflicts is through political channels. However, when this armed group finally abandoned military methods and became involved in politics through the establishment of political parties, the consequence was that they wanted to dominate and control the parliament or gained as much support in the election as possible by diffusing the ideology of GAM to the public.

The strategy used by local parties is to offer work programs so that the ideology of the party they are fighting for is achieved and has the support of the community. Through the ideology that has spread from internal parties to outside parties (community), it has finally made local parties able to control and control politics in Aceh through non-violent channels through the peaceful path that Gramsci called "hegemony." Although the body of the GAM resistance groups has seen a shift in ideology from previously religious to secular and economical. However, we find that the spread of political ideology were reflected in the control behavior of local parties sitting in Aceh's political parties and government.

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