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Satriansyah Den Retno Wardana ¹, Eka N.A.M. Sihombing ², T. Erwinsyahbana³

Fakultas Hukum Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Utara
Jl. Kapten Muchtar Basri No.3, Glugur Darat II, Kec. Medan Tim., Kota Medan, Sumatera Utara, 20238
*Correspondence email : satriansyahdrw@gmail.com

Abstract
The system of government examines the relationship between the legislative and executive institutions. On the other hand, the concept of a government system can also be related to vertical relations between the central government and local governments. Problem formulations for this journal are: What is the character of strengthening the government system at the central and regional levels resulting from the simultaneous general election system in Indonesia? What is the theory and concept of Indonesia's government and public election systems? How is Indonesia's implementation or configuration of the simultaneous (national) general election system and the regional head election system a quo? This research is normative legal research accompanied by supporting data. The research data was collected through a literature study. The analysis was carried out using qualitative methods. Based on the research results, it is concluded that first, The system of government is the concept of legislative and executive relations in carrying out its functions and duties. There are various systems, such as presidential, parliamentary, and mixed. In the presidential system used in Indonesia, there are systemic weaknesses in the form of fixed-term features, dual democratic legitimacy, the possibility of the emergence of a divided government, and the use of multiparty features. Second, the configuration of the simultaneous general election system and the regional head election system shows that the available presidential election system uses the concurrent part, the presidential threshold of 20%, and uses a majority-runoff system with the distribution of votes in certain regions. Third, implementing simultaneous elections and regional heads quo has yet to strengthen the government system significantly. The presidential system only maintains in terms of the number of candidates contesting, and the majority runoff system needs to show strengthening.

Keywords: Presidential system of government, local government system, simultaneous general elections.
INTRODUCTION

The government system is the relationship between the legislative and executive bodies (Adiwilaga et al., 2018). Along the way, the presidential government system has various weaknesses: fixed terms, dual democratic legitimacy, the winner, and the emergence of a divided government (Wardana, 2020). Indonesia's presidential system is used with multiparty combinations, a severe systemic problem (Jalal, 2021). This system will bring additional problems when the emergence of fragmentation of parliamentary power will make relations between bodies deadlock (Hanafi, 2021). Furthermore, it is also influenced by the presidential threshold feature, which damages the basic logic of the presidential government system (Hutabarat, 2022).

As a holistic unity of government, the region's government system carries systemic features in running its government (Haryanti, 2019). In the sense that the concept of legislative and executive relations of regions has the same concept as the concept of relations between these bodies at the central level. In certain conditions with various existing weaknesses, local governments also have the potential to experience dual democratic legitimacy, the winner-takes-all, divided government, and political deadlock (Adiwilaga et al., 2018; Nurhasim, 2020). Moreover, the concept of threshold for regional heads also applies, which, under certain conditions, will also bring weaknesses to the independence of regional executive bodies (Nazriyah, 2015).

In overcoming the weaknesses of the central (national) government system, there has been political efficacy of the community through testing Article 3 paragraph 5, Article 9, Article 12 paragraph 1, Article 14 paragraph 2, and Article 112 of Law Number 42 of 2008 concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections which separates legislative and executive elections, through Application Number 14 / PUU-XI / 2013 (Ansori, 2015; Widaningsih, 2014). This ultimately creates a new legal construction by implementing simultaneous general elections of 5 boxes to
strengthen the government system and the meaning and interpretation of the Constitution's original intent (Kamil, 2017). This decision then has consequences for the emergence of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, which regulates elections with a presidential threshold of 20% (twenty percent), using the majority-runoff method with regional distribution, the district magnitude of the House of Representatives of 3-10 seats and the Regional People's Representative Assembly 3-12 seats, with the parliamentary threshold of 4% (four percent) and using the conversion of votes divisor Sainte lague (Setiawan, 2023; Syahuri & Fahrozi, 2020).

Furthermore, after simultaneous elections in 2019, which argued that there were improvements on one side and weaknesses on the other, As a form of legal dynamics in Indonesia, the public has again tested the constitutionality of the Election Law and the Elections Law through the Test in Case 55/PUU-XVII/2019 to reconstruct simultaneous elections (Hidayat, 2022). Argumentatively, this petition calls for the arrangement of simultaneous elections separately at the central level to elect the President, House of Representatives, and Dewan Perwakilan Daerah and at the regional level to elect Regional Heads and Regional People's Representative Assembly (Irham, 2015).

Simultaneous general elections or even the people's desire, which is "approved" by the Constitution, to conduct simultaneous national and regional elections can be seen through strengthening the government system (Adiarsa, 2023). The politics of simultaneous election law that should be the central discourse is in the form of its influence on strengthening the government system (Noviawati, 2019). This is not unfundamental; elections are used to elect officials in the legislature and the executive who are essential to running the existing government. It is understood that the effort to run the government has been going on since the pre-elections, which were marked by offers of the concept of running the government during the campaign or even in determining coalitions. This shows that the essence and substance of
elections is to run a congruent government (Thoha, 2017). While other weakness factors become administrative, technical factors only

**RESEARCH METHOD**

This study uses a type of normative juridical research with a configuration of a separate simultaneous election system to strengthen the character of an inclusive government system in Indonesia, according to Soerjono, Soekanto, and Sri Mamudji, namely literature law research (Soekanto & Mamudji, 2018). In line with this, normative legal research in the view of Jonaedi Efendi and Johnny Ibrahim can also be referred to as doctrinal legal research. This normative juridical research leads to research on legal principles, where legal research aims to find legal principles or positive legal doctrines that apply (Lubis et al., 2022). This research type is called dogmatic studies or doctrinal research (Simatupang et al., 2022). Research on legal systematics can be carried out on specific or recorded laws (Koto et al., 2022). The primary purpose is to identify the main or basic notions in law: legal society, legal subjects, legal rights and obligations, legal events, legal relations, and legal objects.

**RESULTS, DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS**

**Government System and General Election System**

The government system is a concept that examines the relationship between legislative and executive power (Adiwilaga et al., 2018; Enggarani, 2019). Kusnardi and Harmaily Ibrahim divide the government system and state form or, in other words, the form of power in horizontal and vertical divisions (Tutik, 2017). The vertical relationship deals with the consequences of the form of the state, i.e., the central government and autonomous regions. Horizontally, power is divided into different organizational forms based on their functions, namely legislative, executive, and judicial (Abdullah, 2016). Jimly believes that
the *regeringsdaad* system means the relationship of the government system in executive and legislative functions (Toding, 2017). It also means a system of governance relations between institutions.

Jimlmy divided the characteristics of the presidential government system that incidentally is used at the central government level in Indonesia, namely (i) fixed term features for the presidential *term*, (ii) the executive is directly responsible to the people, (iii) the people directly elect the executive, (iv) legislative and executive relations do not submit to each other and cannot dissolve each other, (v) there is no separation of the head of state and head of government, (vi) the President as *top of government or concentration of governing power and responsibility upon the President* (Ramadhan, 2018).

Behind the features in the government system, there are systemic weaknesses, especially government instability, which in the Indonesian context is in the form of (i) government instability due to multiparty combinations, (ii) fixed terms that result in rigid government relations, (iii) *dual democratic legitimacy* which at some point between the two cannot influence each other, (iv) the *winner takes all* which would discourage the incentives of cooperation and allow for *divided government* or even political *deadlocks*, and (v) also disproportionate authority in parliament. Therefore, conceptually, implementing simultaneous general elections strengthens the system's stability. Mark P Jones said that strengthening the system occurs if legislative support for the executive occurs proportionally. More detail can be seen through the features of the *electoral formula*, parliamentary threshold, and *district magnitude*, which will simplify the party to provide adequate political support to the executive (Aisah et al., 2021; Wardana, 2020).

Indonesia's constitutional history has consequences for the fate of local
governments that have shifted power relations from centralistic-authoritarian to decentralistic-autonomous. Previously, the local government's placement into the local state government concept made regions sidelined over various important aspects (Haryanti, 2019). Strengthening local government concretely is contained in Article 18, paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution and various local government laws. The most important thing that can be a benchmark for strengthening is the concept of decentralization, which describes three main elements, namely (i) the formation of an autonomous government, (ii) the division of autonomous regions, and (iii) the handover of government management to autonomous regions (Asshiddiqie, 2022).

Decentralization has a condition sine quo none element of autonomy as a zelfwetgeving facility to make its own rules. To carry out the constitutional mandate in the form of local self-government jawantahan, based on the provisions in the Law on Regional Government, regional government is carried out by the Regional Representative Council and regional heads. Therefore, the government and regional legislature have an equal position based on the people's mandate with different functions.

Regarding local government and elections, the Regional People's Representative Council, consisting of members of political parties, is elected through general elections. Another connection can also be seen that (i) the Local Government Law regulates the calculation of the number of Regional People's Representative Councils of each region based on the population in the area. (ii) determination of party votes and candidate members based on the results of general elections in constituencies, (iii) determination of the number of voter divisors based on the allocation of regions formed.

People's sovereignty expressed in a general election is formulated in four
things, namely (i) for the peaceful succession of national leadership, (ii) the change of officials as representatives of the interests of the people, (iii) the implementation of the principle of popular sovereignty, (iv) implementing the principle of principle, (v) functioning as a mechanism for converting voters' votes into positions in legislative and executive institutions.

Conceptually and systemically, according to Satya Arianto, there are several models of executive elections, namely, First, *First Past the Post*, which is based on the majority voting system. Second, in the *Two Round System*, if there is no candidate with a majority vote, a second round will be conducted—third, *in the Preferential System*, counting by giving preference to candidates if there is no absolute majority vote. Fourth is *Distribution Equipment*, provided that it supports several regions, wins plural elections, and obtains its share of 1/2 or 2/3 of the number of districts (Latif, 2009).

In the legislative election system, absolute features are contained, namely, the *district magnitude*, which underlies the allocation of seats and the number of seats in the election. Second, the mechanism for determining election participants. Third, open list system or closed list. Fourth, minority and majority representation has additional choice features, namely the *threshold* or the minimum number of seats in the proportional and mixed system (*multi-member proportional*). Fifth, the number of constituencies by size: (i) one seat (single-member constituency) or (ii) multiple seats (*multi-member constituency*).

The electoral system is more systemically divided into several types, namely the district election system, proportional electoral system, and semi-proportional electoral system. *First* the district electoral system or majority election in which candidates are elected as representatives in one district based on the candidate with the most votes. The variants in this system are (a) *first*
past the post (FPTP) electability based on the most candidates and single-representative districts, (b) block vote (BV), voters are free to choose as many seats as they will fill, (c) alternative vote (AV) which uses a single representative, complete preferential voting where voters sort their candidates, (d) two-round system (TRS) which is possible to do two turns or also called a runoff system or double ballot.

Second, the proportional system, or multi-member constituencies, has two methods: Single transferable vote (hare system) and list system. The variants in this system are (a) list proportional representation mixed member proportional (MMP), which has several more features, namely the open list system, closed list system, and free list system. The sound conversion method in this system is the Devisor method, which uses the highest average value which then the rest will be divided by a divisor number (D'Hondt or The Sainte Lague) and (b) the Quota method with the provision that the most significant remaining votes are selected with three formulas, one of which is the hare quota which calculates electability by the number of valid votes divided by the number of seats provided by the district, which certainly benefits the small party. Third, a semi-proportional system in which there are three vote conversion systems, namely (a) single non-transferable vote (SNTV), (b) limited vote system (LV), and parallel system.

Configuration of Concurrent General Election System and Regional Head Election System in Indonesia

The intellectual-strategic steps of the Indonesian people to make change through constitutional efficacy by constitutional Review in the Constitutional Court provide a significant shift in constitutional discourse. Judicial Review
through case 14/PUU-XI/2013 examines the norms contained in the Presidential Election Law, namely Law Number 42 of 2008, concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections, the implementation of Article 3 paragraph 5, Article 9, Article 12, Article 14 paragraph 2, Article 112 is postulated to be contrary to the constitutional norms in Article 6A paragraph 2, Article 22E paragraph 1, Article 22E paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution.

Essentially, in his petition, the Petitioner postulated several matters related to the issue of unconstitutionality of the norm, namely: first, the holding of elections twice (not simultaneously) in Article 3 paragraph 5 of the Presidential Election Law is contrary to Article 22E paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution. Second, the potential loss of citizens' constitutional rights related to the budget in fulfilling the rights of other citizens if the election is held more than once. Third, the original interpretation of the constitutional intent requires elections to be held within five years.

Regarding support for the political efficacy of the people, the original fundamental interpretation of the Constitution also requires maintaining the presidential system by simultaneously making improvements toward the purification of the presidential system. It can be understood that simultaneous general elections will provide a choice of straight-ticket facilities, namely choosing the same President as the party they support, or split ticket, which is choosing a different president from the elected party.

Not only that, but several experts also present dialectical views that color the process of political efficacy; Irman Putra Sidin, for example, explained that the primary motive that became the basis for justification in "non-simultaneous elections" in Decision 51-52-59 / PUU-VI / 2008 is no longer relevant and compatible. Argumentatively, this is because four things, namely (i) based on
electoral experience, the possibility of more than two pairs of presidential and vice presidential candidates is irrelevant, (ii) the assumption that simultaneous elections interfere with development is a very partial paranoia, (iii) the difficulties imagined do not necessarily occur in simultaneous elections, (iv) that the fear of lack of support of the House of Representatives to the President is occult reasons in a presidential (not parliamentary) system.

From the point of view of aspects of political psychology, Hamdi Muluk referred to Stoll's view that the temporal proximity of elections held close to the concurrent election format would be practical. Then, it will bring psychological benefits to politics, at least in the aspect of (i) parties that prioritize the basis of policy preferences (platforms) will benefit more by preparing the best presidential and vice presidential packages, (ii) as Csaba Nikolenyi argues, simultaneous elections will increase political participation (voter turn-out) and will reduce psychological fatigue (psychological fatigue).

Through this dialectical study, the court is of the view that to determine whether elections can be held simultaneously or not can be seen from 3 considerations of constitutionality, namely (i) the relationship between the election system and the government system, in his opinion it is described that the President has a strong position because it does not depend on the House of Representatives Although the President still needs parliamentary support for the effectiveness of his administration. From the experience of elections, constitutional practices do not provide strengthening to the government system, which can be seen that electoral practices have not become an ideal social change formation tool; the concept and practice of coalitions have not had a strengthening impact on the government system, (ii) the original intention of the Constitution requires simultaneous elections, (iii) the efficiency of financing
for holding elections will occur through simultaneous elections.

In viewing and analyzing the configuration of the implementation of general elections in Indonesia, especially simultaneous general elections, it can be seen using a system approach where the system is a dynamic constitutional delegation to changes because the procedures for conducting general elections are open public policies that are delegated constitutionally (open legal policy). Within the framework of the electoral system, analysis can be carried out separately between the implementation of presidential and legislative elections. This is not a fundamental assumption; this difference is also based on the features contained in the system.

In the context of executive elections, the period before the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, Article 6 paragraph 2 of the Constitution regulates the indirect election of the President and vice president with the provision of a majority vote. Then the implementing rules contained in Majelis Pconsultative Rakyat Decree Number II / MPR / 1973 concerning Procedures for Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections dated July 3, 1971, which in Saldi Isra's opinion can be observed in 3 things, namely: (i) the implementation of presidential elections is not in the same package with the vice president, (ii) in the nomination of both, the role of the faction is relatively the same, and (iii) the existence of covert power of the President to determine the vice presidential candidate.

After the amendment and the arrangement of presidential and vice presidential elections several times, it can be understood that the system used in Indonesia is similar to the system in Nigeria. The provisions of Article 6A, paragraph 3, and paragraph 4 of the 1945 Constitution indicate the acquisition of votes in the distribution of provinces. Indonesia uses a presidential and vice
presidential election system with an absolute majority of two rounds (\textit{widespread elected-majority runoff}). In more detail, the presidential election arrangements in Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections can be seen through several features of the election system, namely (i) presidential elections are held simultaneously with legislative elections, (ii) nomination methods use a threshold of 20\% of the number of seats in the House of Representatives or 25\% of national valid votes in the previous election, (iii) the method of selection uses a \textit{majority runoff} system (50\% + 1 with a two-round system) and the distribution of votes is at least 20\% of the votes in more than 1/2 (half) of the number of provinces in Indonesia.

Then, in the context of legislative elections, the legislative election system has also experienced systemic change dynamics several times. At the beginning of the reform period, the June 7, 1999 elections used an open proportional system with a list stelsel and an electoral threshold. In the legislative election system, the use of proportional features can be seen in Article 22E paragraph 3 of the 1945 Constitution; this is used to overcome the disproportionality in the district system in voting conventions and encourage new political parties and minor political party representation. However, this feature also needs to improve regarding the vital role of political parties, especially administrators at the center of political parties. It can also be seen that 4 (four) weaknesses of the open proportional system, namely (i) the mechanism of the voting convention into legislative seats is too complex, (ii) the process of recapitulation of votes is long, (iii) this system makes it easier for election actors to conduct vote buying and selling transactions, (iv) there are six contradictions in democratic instruments. This weakness will also bring derivative weaknesses at the implementation level, namely: (i) political
pragmatism tends to damage voter participation, (ii) aspirational difficulties occur due to voters losing control to elected candidates, (iii) weak regeneration of political parties, and (iv) political party oligarchic that approaches elitist nature.

In more detail, the features of the legislative election system can be seen through Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections, namely: (i) legislative elections are concurrent with presidential elections, (ii) using an open proportional system, (iii) allocation of seats in each district (district magnitude) of 3-10 for the People's Representative Council and 3-12 for the Regional People's Representative Council, (iv) the determination of seats is preceded by the following conditions Parliamentary threshold of 4% (four percent) of the national valid vote, (v) voting convention or determination of the number of seats using the Sainte Lague method.

In the regional head election system, there are provisions in the form of features of the regional head election system, namely: (i) the threshold feature for candidacy for regional heads, which to be able to run for regional head must meet the threshold requirement of at least 20% (twenty percent) of the number of seats in the Regional People's Representative Council or 25% (twenty-five percent) of the accumulated valid votes of regional legislators as stipulated in Article 40 paragraph 1 of the Elections Law. However, this requirement gives rise to dualism arrangements as the regional elections in Aceh, based on Article 67, paragraph 1 of the Aceh Government Law, do not regulate such conditions. Then, (ii) generally using the plurality system formula, namely the determination of the elected winner based on the majority vote of regional heads as in Article 107 paragraph 1 and Article 109 paragraph 1 of the Elections Law. This also causes dualism arrangements; namely, it can be seen that specifically, the DKI Jakarta regional head election uses the majority-runoff formula where
the winner is determined if he gets 50% + one vote as in Article 11 paragraph 1 of the Capital Section Regional of Jakarta Government Law.

The Character of Strengthening the Government System Due to the General Elections

As the basic concept of the system of government that defines the relationship between the executive and the legislature in a particular system, Mark P. Jones also analyzes that the strengthening of the system of government is closely related to the proportion of legislative support to the head of government; he states, "... All evidence indicates the functioning of presidential systems is greatly enhanced when the president is provided with a majority or near majority in the legislature." Legislative elections tend to follow executive elections; in government, the executive must have majority support in parliament to avoid the threat of government breakdown. The discourse of strengthening an effective government system can be seen through two aspects: simplifying the party system in parliament (legislature) and strengthening political support to the head of government. Argumentatively, this will be achieved by implementing simultaneous general elections by considering the features of the electoral system itself.

Conceptually, the government system in Indonesia adheres to the presidential system of government. Juan J Linz said that the implementation of a presidential system with a multiparty is a compatibility in itself that will lead to a breakdown of the democratic regime. Mainwaring also noted that the multiparty and presidential government systems are complex in a democratic government. At the level of local government, although the theories do not clearly say about the approach adopted in local government, it can be seen that the practice of local government reflects the presidency systemically, which in a particular constellation of local governments will face the same systemic problems as the presidential government at the center.
Against the above problems, simultaneous elections are a correlation offer for improving Indonesia's presidential system of government. Under certain conditions, concurrent elections will provide a positive-constructive correlation to executive-legislative relations at the central and regional levels through the support of political parties in the legislature because of the coattail effect. In looking at the construction of improving the government system through simultaneous general elections in Indonesia, it can be seen through 3 main conditions, namely: (i) conditions of simultaneous elections in the executive (presidential) election system, (ii) conditions of simultaneous elections in the legislative election system, and (iii) conditions of time for the implementation of legislative and executive elections.

First, the configuration of strengthening relations or government systems through the presidential election system can be seen through several aspects: the electoral formula and the number of pairs of candidates (candidates) who fight. Theoretically, the first feature of the electoral plurality formula alongside simultaneous legislative elections makes political parties tend to ignore less competitive candidates and encourage coalition formation from the start because the absence of a second round to build a re-coalition will eventually make the number of candidates contesting small. Conversely, if electoral plurality is held separately from legislative elections, the "reductive" effect will not simplify parties. Simultaneous elections with the electoral plurality formula will be effective. Conversely, simultaneous elections with the electoral majority runoff formula will produce inflationary parties in parliament.

The electoral majority runoff formula will have the effect of having minimal legislative support for the executive; Fitra Arsil explained that the two-round executive election system would give birth to an unstable and fragmented parliament. This can assume that if the executive cannot be elected in the first round, then in the first round, political parties will tend to focus on contesting votes from
the *coattail effect* rather than focusing on the executive candidate. Furthermore, this happens because the future of political party relations will be longer established if political parties have seats in parliament and will undoubtedly have more bargaining positions in the long term.

The second feature is that in terms of the number of candidates contesting, the number will be influenced by several factors, namely (i) the electoral formula for executive elections, Djayadi Hanan is of the view that the *plurality* system will produce few candidates because prospective candidates and political parties will think about directly getting first place in the election or losing altogether, while the majority runoff system tends to produce many candidates which are political parties and candidates will try to get as many votes as possible and if they lose the first round, the political party will still have the opportunity to join other candidates and will even provide additional *burgening positions* with the capital of the vote base in the first round of elections previously obtained, (ii) the incumbent or *incumbent* Those who return to the race will produce relatively few competitors, this is because the electability of the incumbent is relatively high compared to new candidates, (iii) concurrent elections will produce a small number of presidents, while separate elections produce the opposite.

Stoll believes that if many executive candidates contest, the party will be sharply fragmented, which will lead to instability of the government itself. In the context of Indonesia, as seen from the simultaneous elections in 2019, the factors that affect the number of candidates are influenced by the *presidential threshold* feature, which has a reductive effect on strengthening the (presidential) government system itself. Although this would interfere with the purification of the presidential system, in line with the above discussion, it can be done in practice if it is used to simplify the number of candidates and avoid the sharp fragmentation of political parties.
Second, the legislative election system can be seen through several features: the electoral formula, parliamentary threshold, district magnitude system, and coattail effect. Conceptually, the hypothesis that simplifying the number of parties in the legislature will have a good, stable impact on the government system can be seen from the conditions of the features above. The first feature, the electoral formula, is focused on simplifying the party in parliament to support strategic decisions from the executive. Maurice Duveger's hypothesis explains that this can be seen in two legislative electoral systems: the plurality electoral system relatively produces a two-party system. In contrast, the proportional electoral system tends to produce a multiparty system. Jones, in his research on party systems in Latin America, elaborated that if proportional legislative elections want to simplify parties, they must pay attention to two aspects, namely: (i) simultaneously or not the timing of legislative-executive elections, and (ii) executive elections using the electoral plurality or majority runoff formula.

In Indonesian history, only in the 1999 elections did the threshold and district magnitude have a positive effect, which resulted in a simple multiparty system (limited plurality) with an Effective Number of Political Parties in Parliament (ENPP) index of more than five, the rest extreme multiparty. Legislative elections with an open proportional electoral formula, using the divisor Sainte league conversion method, will further open up accommodation for smaller parties, increasing the number of parties in parliament. Although the system relatively simplifies the party, it is also supported by the electoral threshold or parliamentary threshold feature. However, it can be further explained that the parliamentary threshold feature of 4% (four percent), district magnitude 3-10 seats, still needs to simplify the parties that pass the parliament.

In the view of David Samuels and Matthew Soberg Sughart, "the coattail effect is the ability of a candidate on a given ticket to bring to parliament his party's
candidate on the same ticket, and is conceptually usually operationalized as a correlation between the presidential and legislative votes in a particular constituency. Concurrent elections impact the condition of candidates for heads of government and candidates for legislative members who do not have distant preferences. From the point of view of political psychology, this is a psychological effect of voters that will positively influence a solid coalition and be the answer to the incompatibility of the multiparty presidential system in Indonesia.

Third, the timing of legislative and executive elections can be seen through the features of the concurrent election time and the distance between the beginning of democratization and the implementation of elections. In terms of simplifying parties through concurrent elections that use the electoral majority runoff formula system, the negative impact of the formula will disappear in 3-to four more elections. Meanwhile, in terms of electoral distance from democratization, in Nunes and Thies' view, the majority runoff system will be reduced if it is carried out after 5 to 8 elections.

Fourth, in the analyses mentioned above, simultaneous legislative-executive elections in combination with a plurality system will produce a robust and congruent system of government. Electoral arrangements for regions that use a plurality system are expected to strengthen the government system if regional legislative elections are held simultaneously. This will also strengthen the accommodative aspects of regional issues that will become people's discourse during the campaign. In addition, the implementation of simultaneous regional elections will also shape people's preferences for legislative and executive candidates to be able to vote on a spilled ticket or straight ticket.

CONCLUSION
The system of government is the concept of legislative and executive relations in carrying out its functions and duties. There are various systems, such as presidential, parliamentary, and mixed systems. In the presidential system used in Indonesia, there are systemic weaknesses in the form of fixed-term features, dual democratic legitimacy, the possibility of the emergence of a divided government, and the use of multiparty features. This also happens in the government system in the regions which incidentally have the same features and aspects of government. In the general election system, both executive, legislative, and regional elections, various features can provide reinforcement and weakness on their respective sides.

The configuration of the simultaneous general election system and the regional head election system shows that the general presidential election system uses the concurrent feature, the presidential threshold of 20%, and uses a majority-runoff system with the distribution of votes in certain regions. Legislative elections use a concurrent, open proportional system, district magnitude 3-10 seats of the People's Representative Council, four seats of the People's Representative Council, and 3-12 seats of the Regional People's Representative Council, using a parliamentary threshold of 4% and the divisor Sainte Lague vote conversion method. Furthermore, the local election system generally uses a simple plurality system, and specifically, DKI Jakarta uses a majority runoff and a nomination threshold of 20% of the Regional People's Representative Council seats.

Implementing simultaneous elections and regional heads quo has yet to strengthen the government system significantly. Strengthening of the presidential system only occurs in terms of the number of candidates contesting, and the majority runoff system needs to show strengthening. In terms of the implementation of legislative elections, it has yet to show any strengthening of the use of open list proportionality features, a threshold of 4%, and a district magnitude of 3-12 seats, which does not
show the simplification of the party system. In terms of the implementation of regional head elections that separate elections from regional legislatures, it also does not show the strengthening of the regional government system, when in fact, the *plurality* feature in the regional government system can be a strengthening aspect if regional head elections are held together with regional legislatures.
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